AGO Strategy 2007

MINISTRY SECTOR STRATEGY

(WITH FOCUS ON PRIORITIZATION)



NAME OF MINISTRY OR AGENCY    Attorney General’s Office (AGO)
MINISTRY OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE AND DESIGNATION    Dr. Abdul Jabar Sabit, Attorney General of Afghanistan
PILLAR-SUB-PILLAR-SECTOR AND SUB-SECTOR
    •    Governance, Rule of Law & Human Rights
•    Rule of Law
DATE OF STRATEGY
    15 April 2007.  Second draft.

SECTION ONE: OVERALL SECTOR GOALS AND RESULTS
.1.    Summary
As an organ of the executive but one that is independent in its performance, the AGO is a unique agency of the government of Afghanistan. The AGO’s mandate under Article 134 of the Constitution is for “investigation and filing the case[s] against [prosecuting] the accused in the court.”  The AGO has developed a performance framework to transform itself from a “reactive” and “static” organization into a “proactive” and “dynamic” one in order to fulfill its mandate in a democratic state, to adapt to existing and emerging criminal behavior, and to support the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).

This transformation necessarily involves strategies that change the AGO’s existing organizational structure and long-time practices, procedures, and protocols, particularly, its traditional relationship with the police. The twin themes of this transformation are specialization and integration.  Specialization will improve thematic and substantive capacity and service delivery.  Integration will improve the AGO’s processes, work practices, and methodology.  Integration involves process flexibility that comprises elements of vertical prosecution and collaboration with other law enforcement agencies in proactive investigative processes.  Together, these two themes of specialization and integration define the AGO’s model for change.

.2.    Mission Statement:
The AGO’s  mission is to serve all of the people of Afghanistan, without discrimination, by defending the people’s right to safety and security, and ensuring fairness, impartiality, and justice when investigating and prosecuting criminality.  This also requires monitoring the implementation of laws in order to promote peace and prosperity through the rule of law, and to enhance the quality of life of the Afghan people.

.3.    Goals:

To build, by 2012, a modern, professional prosecutorial service and to improve the AGO’s capacity to function effectively, efficiently, fairly, ethically, impartially, and transparently in the discharge of its constitutional mandate and legal competencies.  This will require  the highest levels of cooperation and collaboration with other national and international law enforcement and justice agencies, placing priority on anti-corruption and  anti-narcotics, and instilling ethics and professionalism into the AGO in order to earn the trust of the public and facilitate the reinstitution of the rule of law in Afghanistan.

The AGO’s strategic goals are necessarily derived from the ANDS Governance and Rule of Law Benchmark.  The five ANDS indicators applicable to the AGO are:
1)    Reforms to strengthen professionalism, integrity and credibility of AGO;
2)    Oversight procedures relating to corruption, lack of due process, miscarriages of justice reviewed and reformed;
3)    Functioning Attorney General Offices in all provinces of Afghanistan;
4)    Infrastructure rehabilitation (including physical, transportation and equipment resources);
5)    Rehabilitation of the Human Resources section.

Each of these five strategic themes presents multiple challenges.  The implementing strategies are designed to change the way the AGO performs its mandate and delivers its services.  This transformation will be complete when the AGO achieves the expected results discussed below.


.4.    Expected Results:

1.3.1. Reforms to strengthen the professionalism, integrity and credibility of the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) will produce a modern prosecution service, reflecting the ethnic and gender composition of Afghan society, and has the following qualities:

1.3.1.1.Professionalism: Prosecutors who
at a minimum, hold university degree in law or sharia;
have been hired based upon objective and transparent criteria including examination,, interviews, and legal experience;
successfully complete the AGO Stage course (prosecutor vocational training induction course);
 successfully complete continuing legal education throughout their prosecution career, including specialized training to develop proficiency in the substantive areas of corruption, narcotics, and organized crime, and use of modern investigative, prosecution and management methods; and
are motivated by the AGO’s emphasis on professional development and technical expertise, and rewarded by promotion and professional recognition.

1.3.1.2. Integrity:  Prosecutors in an Office that has established
a Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct enforced by a transparent disciplinary process with appeal rights within the AGO;
 institutional mechanisms for advising prosecutors on ethical violations and for promoting and improving ethical conduct;
 procedures to accept complaints, including anonymous ones, which can initiate ethical investigations, and publicized these procedures using community outreach and mass media;
 an AGO division with the capacity to investigate and adjudicate ethical violations and impose disciplinary sanctions;
 the AGO’s institutional membership in the International Association of Prosecutors (IAP) to promote and protect the integrity of the profession;
a policy of support and recognition of the benefits of the Afghan Prosecutors Association (APA) and the APA’s membership in the IAP; and
an objective and transparent procedure for impartial hiring, transfer, promotion, and retirement for AGO prosecutors and staff.

        1.3.1.3. Credibility: Prosecutors in an Office that
         builds into the AGO a public service culture that increases public trust and confidence;
         is responsive to community concerns;
         is supportive of an active APA that performs community outreach, such as adopting high schools for legal literacy programs;
         supports and advises witnesses and victims through the criminal justice system, with an emphasis on assistance to victims and witnesses of corruption and gender based crimes; and
         has programs and activities to bring prosecutors closer to their community.

1.3.2 Oversight procedures relating to lack of due process, corruption and miscarriage of justice will be reviewed and revised to ensure fair, impartial, and effective oversight to provide justice by:

          developing and implementing joint guidelines to monitor and coordinate police and prosecutor cooperation;
          developing, testing, and implementing a joint information management system to monitor and coordinate police and prosecutor evidence management;
         developing standardized internal case management review protocols and practices that use statistical analysis and individual case reviews;
.         starting internal case management review of corruption, witness intimidation, and other high priority cases, and to eventually include all felony-level provincial cases;
          implementing specific case reviews of repeat offenders, suspects, defendants, or victims who are juveniles or women offenders;         
          implementing specific case reviews to monitor pre-trial detention decisions and verdicts of acquittal for compliance with criminal procedure time limits and reasons for detention;
          designing and publishing public complaint processes, including solicitation of anonymous information regarding investigations, prosecutions, and methods to prevent retaliation against complainants; and
          reviewing and revising appellate policy and strategy to ensure the filing of appeals in the interest of justice, including recommendations for reversal of unfair verdicts or trials that substantially violated procedural rights.


1.3.3. Infrastructure Rehabilitation – expand and improve:
infrastructure and space capacity at AGO Headquarters (HQ) and provincial level buildings to a sufficient quality and quantity to allow effective and efficient investigation and prosecution while protecting victim and witness privacy, dignity and security;
transportation capacity to allow effective and efficient investigation and prosecution, including transport of prosecutors from HQ to provinces, and from provincial and district offices to crime scenes, detention facilities and witness locations; also to allow transport of victims and witnesses to investigative hearings and trials;
communication assets and equipment to ensure coordination between AGO HQ and provinces, and to allow centralized calendar and docket case management, review and oversight, including improved data processing, human resources, and capacity; and
AGO resource strategy and resource implementation strategy.

1.3.4. Transformation of the AGO into a Fully Functioning Institution

1.3.4.1. The AGO will be restructured for modern prosecution within the limits of the Government’s resources.  This includes (1) creating specialized departments, divisions, and units; (2) targeted training and mentoring for specialized prosecutors; and (3) restructuring at sub-provincial levels for more effective and efficient allocation of human and physical resources.
 
1.3.4.2. Updated work and operating procedures and protocols will be established, including a specialized and integrated prosecution strategy that involves (1) elements of both vertical and horizontal prosecution, (2) specialized case and evidence management, (3) central and provincial file archiving, and (4) statistical comparisons and studies of results.  

1.3.4.3. Specialized units at the AGO HQ and provincial offices will target:  Cases of corruption, narcotics, prosecutor ethics code violations, international legal assistance/extradition, gross violations of human rights, police and correction officer misconduct, detention violations, human trafficking, and gender and juvenile sensitive cases.

1.3.4.4. Critical to the success of 1.3.4.1 through 1.3.4.3 are improved relations and cooperation with other national law enforcement agencies; in particular police- prosecutor collaboration.  Mutual cooperation with foreign and international prosecutorial and law enforcement agencies is also necessary.  Planned outcomes include the creation of specialized taskforces and projects to combat complex criminal behavior, such as the existing Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) established to combat narcotics cultivation and trafficking.  The CJTF has been in operation for approximately two years.

1.3.4.5. Increased technical capacity will be provided for litigation support through the hiring, training and development of paralegal and litigation support staff, and the development of case, evidence, and witness management systems.

1.3.4.6. Effective and efficient administration and management of AGO will be instituted and professionally trained administrators recruited.

1.3.4.7. The AGO will achieve a position closer to gender balance through the use of promotions, transfers, and increased employment opportunities.  This will include striving to meet ANDS gender targets using affirmative action and outreach to recruit, educate, and train female attorneys.

1.3.4.8. The AGO will increase the transparency of its administration by improving recordkeeping and information management, by revising its operating procedures, and making printed rulebooks available to prosecutors.  The AGO will also develop criminal justice policy based on recorded facts and statistics.
 
The above stated results will require significant realignment of the organizational structure of the AGO so that it becomes more effective, efficient, transparent, ethical, and professional.  This will include integrated prosecution processes.  It will also require prosecutors to work closely with the judicial police and to become familiar with covert and technical surveillance, controlled delivery techniques, working with informants, and interdiction investigative methods.  In addition, this will require an integrated working relationship with the appropriate police agencies.  This will also rely upon increased specialization of departments and units within the AGO to create a more professional prosecuting service.  That specialization will in turn enable greater delegation of authority and targeted training to use human resources more efficiently.  These expected results also rely upon coordination and cooperation with the Ministry of Interior as partners in law enforcement.

Additionally, instituting explicit ethical standards and training with transparent disciplinary procedures will improve integrity and reduce corruption, lack of due process, and miscarriages of justice.  

Finally, improving physical infrastructure at the AGO HQ and in the provinces will help provide effective, functioning justice institutions.  This effectiveness will result in the successful prosecution of medium and high level cases while safeguarding the Constitutional rights of the accused.  This result will be found in four of the five ANDS cross-cutting themes (gender, counter-narcotics, anti-corruption, and regional cooperation against terrorism and organized crime),


1.4   Priority Expected Results:

1.4.1    Priority expected results of reform to strengthen Professionalism:

1.4.1.1.     By the end of 2010, 100% of prosecutor candidates admitted to AGO Stage   
                 Course will hold degrees in law or sharia from a creditable university.
1.4.1.2.    By the end of 2010, 100% of entry level prosecutors will have completed AGO Stage vocational training.
1.4.1.3.    By the end of 2009, 20% of prosecutors in Afghanistan will have completed post-Stage practical skill investigative and prosecution training, including police-prosecutor collaborative training.
1.4.1.4.    By the end of 2009, 50% of Prosecutors at AGO HQ will have acquired specialized and advanced skills, including the ability to plan and lead proactive police-prosecutor investigations.  These investigations will be of complex and organized crimes, including crimes of corruption, narcotics, human trafficking, and those targeting victims due to gender, nationality, or ethnicity.  By the end of 2010, 10% of prosecutors in the provinces shall have acquired specialized and advanced skills, including the ability to plan and lead proactive police-prosecutor investigations.
1.4.1.5.    By the end of 2012, the AGO will increase representation of women to at least 30% of all senior appointments and 30% of all prosecutor positions, while implementing the National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA) and Eliminating Violence Against Women (EVAW).  The AGO will use affirmative action and community outreach to recruit, educate, and train women attorneys to meet these goals.  In the provinces, these goals are dependent upon there being sufficiently secured environments to safely allow such gender balance, and subject to the consent of the women prosecutors involved.  The AGO HQ and major provincial offices shall both meet these goals.
1.4.1.6.    By the end of 2011 juvenile investigations, prosecution, and sentencing will be conducted in an integrated and harmonized manner, in consultation and cooperation with all juvenile justice agencies.
1.4.1.7.    By the end of 2010, the AGO will have a prosecutorial presence in at least 90% of the districts in Afghanistan, security permitting.  “Hardening” insecure sites, depending upon available funding, and Ministry of Interior protective support will increase the AGO’s ability to meet and exceed this goal.

1.4.2.    Priority Expected results to achieve Functioning Justice Institutions

1.4.2.2.    By the end of 2008 there will be a fully operational AGO Management Information System (MIS).  This will include communication and information technology, the necessary equipment, technical staff, and training to enable prosecutors to effectively use the MIS.
1.4.2.3.    By the end of 2008 the AGO internet website will be designed, established, and fully operational.  This will include trained prosecutors and technical staff to program the website and provide and update its legal content.
1.4.2.4.    By the end of 2008 the AGO records management and computerized central file archive will be established and fully operational at the AGO HQ.
1.4.2.5.    By the end of 2007 the AGO “resource center,” including full law library, computers, and internet connections will be fully operational at the AGO HQ.
1.4.2.6.    By the end of 2009 the AGO HQ Deputy and Director (Raees) leadership will have improved capacity for policymaking, drafting operating procedures, and setting professional standards.  The senior leadership in the major provinces will also have improved their capacity for the same.


1.4.3.    Other Expected Results

1.4.3.2.    Expected Results to Strengthen Integrity and Oversight Reforms

1.4.3.2.1.    By the end of 2007 the AGO Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct will have been drafted and promulgated by the AG and distributed throughout the AGO.  Appropriate prosecutor training will have been conducted.  
1.4.3.2.2.    By the end of 2007 the new Law on AGO with new procedures on ethical discipline, hiring, promotion, transfer, and termination will have been drafted and submitted by the Government to the National Assembly for enactment.
1.4.3.2.3.    By the end of 2008, if the National Assembly has enacted the new Law on the Organization and Structure of the AGO, new ethical, disciplinary, and advisory procedures will be in place at AGO HQ.
1.4.3.2.4.    By the end of 2008 AGO ethical, disciplinary, and advisory mechanisms shall have begun publication of rulings and findings to prosecutors.
1.4.3.2.5.    By the end of 2008 prosecutorial hiring, promotion, transfer, and termination procedures will be in place at AGO HQ and the major provincial prosecutor’s offices.
1.4.3.2.6.    By the end of 2009 the “Prosecutor’s Promise’ will have been completed and put into effect.  This is a personalized mission statement that is part of the cultural transformation of the AGO.  It reflects the ethical and public duty perspective of the prosecution service. It is a subjective first person view to be taken by prosecutors.
1.4.3.2.7.    By the middle of 2007 the AGO will have established an inter-agency coordination commission with the Ministry of Interior to draft joint guidelines and instructions on police-prosecution investigation and collaboration.
1.4.3.2.8.    By the end of 2009 the AGO will have established inter-agency commissions or working groups with the Supreme Court, Ministry of Justice, and Ministry of Women’s Affairs to coordinate efforts against crime..
1.4.3.2.9.    By the end of 2009 the AGO will have established a Criminal Justice Citizen’s Charter Commission for victims, witnesses and accused.  The Citizen’s Charter is designed to inculcate a service culture within the AGO.  It is put into a publicly prominent place in each office.


1.4.3.3.    Expected Results – Functioning Institutions in Every Province – Strengthening Institutional Effectiveness and Credibility

1.4.3.3.1.    By the end of 2012 the organizational redesign of the AGO HQ and major provincial offices for specialization and integration will be fully implemented.
1.4.3.3.2.    By the end of 2010 effective case completion, caseload, and case management mechanisms will be operational and used by all prosecutors at AGO HQ and used by 30% of the prosecutors in the major provinces.
1.4.3.3.3.    By the end of 2010 effective witness and victim management mechanisms will be operational and used by all prosecutors at AGO HQ, and by 30% of the prosecutors in the major provinces.
1.4.3.3.4.    By the end of 2010 there will be a measurable increase in rate of convictions for cases that are tried to verdict by prosecutors at AGO HQ and in the major provinces.
1.4.3.3.5.    By the end of 2010 there will be a measurable reduction in rate of investigations at AGO HQ and in the major provinces that do not lead to an indictment due to witness and victim unavailability, witness statements that violate procedural rules, or lack of resources (e.g., vehicles).
1.4.3.3.6.    By the end of 2010 there will be a measurable reduction in time it takes to process the average case from intake to verdict at AGO HQ and in the major provinces.
1.4.3.3.7.    By the end of 2009 there will be a data collection system in place and data disaggregated by sex, victim, and suspect.
1.4.3.3.8.    By the end of 2010 there will be effective public communications and complaint mechanisms in place at HQ and in at least three of the major provinces, which will be accessible to all citizens.  Effective public outreach and legal literacy will target women and children.
1.4.3.3.9.    By the end of 2010 there will be improved public perception of the prosecution service as measured by indicia of competence, integrity, fairness, effectiveness, and success in combating crimes of corruption, narcotics, and those relating to gender.  The public will also perceive the prosecution service as providing public safety and security in partnership with other law enforcement agencies.

1.4.3.4.    Expected results to achieve Infrastructure rehabilitation at HQ and in 34 provinces

1.4.3.4.1.    By end of 2008 the construction of the new AGO HQ will be completed.
1.4.3.4.2.    By the end of 2008 the new AGO HQ offices will be fully furnished and equipped, including communications, data processing, and MIS.
1.4.3.4.3.    By end of 2009 AGO office space will be allocated and occupied in completed Integrated Justice Facilities in the provinces.
1.4.3.4.4.    By the end of 2012 the construction and rehabilitation of AGO facilities will be completed in all provincial prosecutors offices, and in 50% of all district offices,
1.4.3.4.5.    By the end of 2012 AGO provincial offices will be fully equipped in all provinces and in 50% of all district offices.
1.4.3.4.6.    By 2012 the AGO policy of restructuring at the sub-provincial level will be implemented to extend the accessibility and reach of prosecutors to 80% of Afghanistan.  This policy will align the available AGO human resources and physical structures with the Afghan people’s needs.
1.4.3.4.7.    By the end of 2009 effective and adequate transportation will be available at HQ, provincial, and sub-provincial levels.  The vehicles will be fitted to the specific needs of the prosecution services, and victims and witnesses at specific sites.  The vehicles will include buses, pickup trucks, Sport Utility Vehicles, cars, motorcycles, and bicycles.
1.4.3.4.8.    By the end of 2010 prosecutor offices at the AGO HQ and in 10% of provinces will include facilities specially rehabilitated or constructed for women, children, victims, protected witnesses, and the disabled.
 
1.4.3.5.    Expected Results to Reform Oversight Procedures related to Lack of Due Process, Miscarriages of Justice and Corruption

1.4.3.5.1.    By the end of 2009 investigative management guidelines and data collection protocols will be in place in AGO HQ and major provinces, and implemented to examine statistical discrepancies.  These guidelines will give priority to police referrals, arrest, detention, charging decisions, and potential corruption.
1.4.3.5.2.    By the end of 2008 investigative protocols will be in place in AGO HQ and major provinces to investigate any report or complaint of prosecutor ethical misconduct or procedural irregularities in hiring, firing, and promotion decisions.
1.4.3.5.3.    By the end of 2010 protocols to investigate any report or complaint of prosecutor ethical misconduct or procedural irregularities in hiring, firing and promotion decisions will be in place in all provinces.
1.4.3.5.4.     By the end of 2009 investigative and trial management guidelines and data collection protocols will be implemented to examine statistical discrepancies, to determine gender or juvenile bias or de facto unequal treatment.  This will include review of all unprosecuted cases involving serious injury or death to women.
1.4.3.5.5.    By the end of 2008 agreements will be reached and protocols designed with international and national agencies and NGOs to accept information and investigate complaints regarding treatment of cases involving women and juvenile suspects or victims.  These agreements will include the Ministry of Women’s Affairs MOWA), the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), Justice Sector Monitoring Project (JSMP) monitoring program, the UNAMA Human Rights division, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), and the US State Department Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP), among others.  
1.4.3.5.6.    By the end of 2008 a review of all cases will be initiated in the major provinces regarding the detention and charging practices involving those charged with moral crimes (home escape, elopement, adultery, and kidnapping by romantic partners).  This review will be supervised by the AGO HQ Special Prosecutions Division and use statistical comparison and case review to determine whether there has been de facto unequal treatment of girls and women by police, prosecution, and court practices.
1.4.3.5.7.    By the end of 2008 prosecutor performance and management targets and guidelines will be in operation.
1.4.3.5.8.    By the end of 2009 the APA shall have established a presence in all provinces, have an active organization with funding, and an operational six day a week office premises to fulfill its Charter.
1.4.3.5.9.    By the end of 2009 AGO budget, procurement, and payroll guidelines will be in operation in all provinces, in conjunction with the Ministry of Finance.



SECTION TWO: CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS
2.1 Analysis of the Current State of the Sector

Thirty years of war and the AGO’s near abolition under the Taliban regime resulted in procedural stagnation, infrastructure destruction and decay, and the loss of institutional memory.  Innovation and the ability to cope with new criminal challenges were lost amid the chaos of armed conflict.  This is evident in the accelerated development of organized criminal networks trafficking in narcotics and feeding upon corruption.

The AGO, through the first half of 2006, was reactive to corruption and most crimes, dealing only with those cases brought to it by the police.  The exception has been counter-narcotics, where the creation of the CJTF has led to some developments in proactive investigations, modern surveillance, and the use of informants.  The new Counter-Narcotics Law and Central Narcotics Court has brought donor funding and mentoring to that area.  However, other substantive prosecuting areas have been neglected, perpetuating the AGO’s human resource capacity weakness and infrastructure dilapidation, with collapsing structures at HQ and total lack of infrastructure in a number of districts around the country.

Space needs for prosecution staff and citizenry alike are unmet, as are needs for transportation and communication assets.  Lack of accurate data concerning infrastructure and assets and their amortization hinders development and donor funding.  An example is the new AGO HQ construction project.  Though funding was available for the initial three buildings from the Ministry of Finance, poor planning and contractor execution difficulties have resulted in delays and confusion.  

Organizational structure is an issue that has, over the years, received little attention.  Regime changes have resulted in various functions and competencies being added to or subtracted from the AGO.  Its mandate and position within the justice system has expanded and contracted as part of the shifting policy priorities of past regimes.   Both its mandate and position were stabilized in the 2004 Constitution at Article 134.  However, applicable criminal procedure articles from at least four laws still cause confusion as to its relations with the police during the detection and investigation of crimes.  The question must therefore be raised as to whether the AGO’s current structure is suitable for implementing and achieving the strategic and developmental priorities of the Afghan Government (in the ANDS and Constitution).  

In short, is the AGO’s current structure able to meet emerging challenges to public safety, security, and morality, and fulfill its mandate and competencies?  Can the AGO do this while ensuring all suspects and victims are informed of and have their human rights respected?

Organizational Analysis:

Changes made to the AGO operating structures since 2004 have occurred without express reference to an overarching strategy.  Though new departments have been created (such as the Counter-Narcotics department), there was little in the way of a comprehensive strategy and action plans to implement the governing strategic documents affecting the AGO.  The Afghanistan Compact and the UN Convention Against Corruption are two such documents.

A comprehensive review revealed that certain traditional functions could be better performed outside AGO.  Functions that should legally or could operationally be performed outside AGO should be eliminated or rationalized.  Other functions now being performed but not currently part of AGO structure should be legally incorporated into the AGO’s structure.  Areas of conflict, tension, and/or duplication with other government agencies and/or ministries should be resolved through role clarification and strategic cooperation.  These areas involve the Police, General Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (GIACC), Anti-Bribery Commission, and Afghan National Army Legal Corps.

Findings of Assessments by International Advisers
Both UNDP and the Italian Justice Project (IJP) conducted, under AGO direction, institutional assessments of the AGO.  JSSP conducted an assessment of prosecutor offices and functions in three large provinces (Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and Nangahar) to guide its joint police-prosecutor training and issued an executive summary of its findings.

These assessments identified a number of constraints and made certain recommendations for improving AGO, including:

1.  Legal & Technical Capacity – the technical competence of AGO prosecutors, managers, and administrative staff requires updating and improvement.  Raising technical capacity is essential to develop a modern prosecuting force.  This must be done through hiring qualifications, vocational induction training (i.e. Stage Course), and continuing legal education training.  Improving competence through specialization is another essential component.

2.  Police-Prosecutor Collaboration – Collaboration between police and prosecutors is made difficult by legal, institutional, and cultural constraints.  The tensions and conflicts existing between the Police Law and Interim Criminal (Procedure) Code for Courts (ICPC), among other laws, are compounded by the different approaches to jurisdiction by the two agencies.  The mixed but primarily positive results from the CJTF model of police- prosecutor collaboration present useful lessons learned regarding strategy making for police prosecutor relations in specialized criminal settings.  The MOI-AGO Commission initiative of the AG and Minister of Interior has the potential to demonstrate early success in formulating protocols and guidelines as to cooperation generally between the two agencies.  Improvements in prosecutorial technical capacity and information systems must be closely coordinated with the Ministry of Interior systems.  Finally, the confusion and contradictions between the overlapping laws applicable in criminal procedure must be resolved by the enactment of the draft criminal procedure code now before the Ministry of Justice’s Taqnin Department.  They include the 1965 criminal procedure code, the 1978 Law on Discovery and Investigation, the 2004 ICPC, the 2005 Police Law, and the 2005 Anti-Narcotics Law, among others.

3.  Institutional Management Development – AGO administration and management is erratic and not uniform.  This is due to the lack of management and operational skills, which affects budgeting and planning.  It also contributes to AGO under-funding, resulting in institutional and infrastructural decay.  Improved leadership and management skills of administrators and technical managers, together with improved management information systems, will lead to significant changes in the way AGO does business and how it is perceived by the public.

4.  Function- oriented restructuring – the AGO’s current structure is outdated.  Given the passage of time thorough various regimes as stated above, the structure has not been addressed in a systemic way.  As a result, considerable overlap and confusion occurs between and within departments and units.

5. Infrastructural rehabilitation – the poor state of infrastructure is illustrated by intense overcrowding, water seepage, crumbling walls and ceilings, and a lack of electricity and basic facilities in the AGO HQ and Kabul Provincial Offices.  Other prosecutors’ offices in the provinces are even worse, being non-existent or placed in inadequate structures.  There is ongoing construction of integrated justice facilities in some provinces by the international community.  However, the allocation of space to the AGO in these new structures is lagging behind.  Furthermore, due to poor budget planning and lack of funds, providing the necessary additional resources in the operating budget for these new facilities is often overlooked by AGO managers.  Budget resources for maintenance and repair are often not included.

5.  Vehicle and Equipment Needs – there is a continuing lack of even basic supplies and equipment at AGO HQ, provincial, and particularly at sub-provincial levels.  This deficit often results in AGO staff either using their own resources to buy office equipment, furniture, and consumables (like paper and pen), or the prosecutors simply do without.  Furthermore, lack of vehicles at the provincial and sub-provincial levels contributes to the capacity deficiencies, as it causes delays in investigations and trials.  Worse, the lack of vehicles results in the absence of witnesses and victims from the proceedings, absence of the prosecutors from crime scenes, and prevents interviews of witnesses and victims. This results in procedural and human rights violations.  Lack of transportation contributes to illegal delays and prolonged pre-trial detention of accused persons.  Thus, the vehicle and equipment needs, as well as infrastructure problems, result in violations of constitutional rights and basic international standards for fair trial.  The ineffective or non-existent investigations also result in avoidable acquittals and prevent justice being served, especially in complex corruption and organized crimes.
 
6.  Information Management - current case management systems are inadequate and need to be reviewed in line with structural changes.  A comprehensive MIS assessment and strategy has been conducted and developed.  Proposals have been submitted to the Ministry of Finance to fund the implementation of the MIS strategy over the next four years.  In addition, an assessment of the information and communications technology needs of the AGO have been conducted at HQ.  Implementation of the recommendations commenced with the design of the AGO’s website.  A Joint Information Management System across the criminal justice chain, though beyond the scope of this strategic plan, is a priority and is essential for Police-Prosecutor collaboration.  The needs of this collaboration must be addressed in coordination and cooperation among criminal justice sector actors: the Supreme Court, Ministry of Justice (prisons), Ministry of Interior, AGO, and Ministry of Communications.  A computerized archive and a resource center will reinforce the information management system in the AGO.  A starting point could be the revision, publication, and distribution of standardized formats for case and file identification.

7.  Policy and Strategy Making Capacity – the capacity to analyze, develop, plan, and implement policy and strategy is still weak, as is management performance.  Efforts to improve technical and administrative capacity for performance management are ongoing.  Efforts to improve policy analysis and planning are complicated by structural concerns that distribute this important developmental issue across various departments and divisions.  Further, the absence of an adequate statutory mandate in the existing Law on the Structure of the AGO for the High Council to institutionalize policy-making also impedes policy development coordination.  Last, the current split of what should be a central “cassation” or Solicitor General’s department into multiple units in different departments prevents a unified AGO policy towards the expected development by the Supreme Court of constitutional and statutory jurisprudence.  

8.  Research and Reporting Capacity – modern policymaking capacity starts with data collection and records keeping.  These, in turn, are functions of information processes, flows, methodology, and technology.  Though there have been improvements in research and publication of AGO statistics, reporting from some of the provinces and districts continues to be non-existent, sporadic, inconsistent, and at times inaccurate.  Further, data and information management across the criminal justice sector are still being developed.  

Overall assessments suggest that the AGO has the capacity to successfully investigate and prosecute simple crimes such as theft and simple robbery, but still has difficulties in successfully (effectively and efficiently) investigating and prosecuting more complex crimes.  These include government corruption, embezzlement, and other forms of financial crimes, as well as organized or complex terrorist crimes.  This is due to unfamiliarity with the tactics, strategies, and methodologies of proactive investigations, resource constraints, and the lack of capacity (in most cases) to properly build a case.  To do so with sufficient evidence requires performing detailed and properly sequenced interviews of witnesses, obtaining documentary evidence and corroboration, use of experts such as forensic auditors, and uncovering other circumstantial evidence.  The use of covert and technical surveillance techniques, use of informants, and monitoring and controlling deliveries require modern equipment and training.  Such modern techniques also require a statutory basis not present in the current criminal procedure for any crimes other than narcotics trafficking.  These techniques also require close prosecutorial guidance and monitoring of law enforcement officials during the investigation to ensure an effective case is made without violating the procedural and constitutional rights of the suspects.

Current Afghan prosecutorial methodology usually employs “arrest,” followed by the suspect’s admissions or confession.  The confession thus serves as both the predicate to and the principal means of investigation, and is often the main proof relied upon by the indictment.  It will be necessary for the AGO investigators to build a case through complex circumstantial evidence comprised of both documents and witness testimony.  Many times the arrest is based on a third-party complaint rather than direct evidence. There are emerging exceptions to this; some of which can be found in the work of the CJTF.

The current criminal procedure code limitation requiring the filing of an indictment or release within 30 days of the arrest combines with other deficits, resulting in cases that are ill-prepared for trial.  These other factors include lack of funding, lack of prosecutor training and experience with complex investigations, lack of a proper specialized and integrated organizational structure, the lack of transportation, equipment, furniture, as well as inadequate working conditions and physical infrastructure,.  The lack of proper prosecution-police collaboration during investigations is magnified by the 30 day time limitation and results in cases that are ill-prepared for trial.  This, when combined with the lack of funding for forensic financial and other experts, is a particularly critical handicap to the effective functioning of the criminal justice system.  Adding in the low salaries prosecutors are currently being paid to the mix makes for fertile ground to breed ineptitude and corruption.   

A dynamic approach to combating corruption has been embarked upon by the current Attorney General with significant improvements in the number of investigations and convictions of low and mid-level government officials for corruption crimes.  The lack of political support, and in some cases political interference, has combined with the above deficits to prevent the Attorney General from achieving more.  However, this record could be improved upon through improved case preparation and collaboration by police and prosecutors, better judicial awareness of corruption laws, and, in some instances, enforcement of judicial impartiality.  

The findings of deficits in the assessments described above may be finally summarized and compared to the ANDS Benchmarks as follows: (1) legal and policy framework (within the benchmark of Functioning Institutions); (2) Physical Infrastructure, (3) Human Resources (Reforms to Strengthen Professionalism, Integrity and Credibility), and (4) work methodology and case flow (Review and Reform of Oversight Procedures to Eliminate Lack of Due Process, Corruption and Miscarriage of Justice).

2.2    Analysis of Key Strategic Elements and Processes in Past Programming that Contributed to Success

2.2.1    Understanding and Meeting the Strategic Challenges faced by the AGO in the New Constitutional Mandate.  The AGO has been challenged by having significant structural changes imposed externally, and not receiving much donor attention as compared to its law enforcement partner, the Ministry of Interior.  However, the AGO’s focus on the AGO’s core functions, as defined by its mandate under Article 134 of the Constitution and applicable law, has facilitated a unity of purpose and goals.  This AGO strategy has allowed its strategy-making and subsequent activities to be mandate-driven.  It also permits the AGO to consider the full strategic and operational implications of the institutional and directional choices senior managers make on behalf of the organization.  The 2004 placement of full responsibility for investigation upon the AGO was a change of mandate and mission of great magnitude.  It requires a much higher AGO technical capacity, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and more resources, both human and physical, than the previous detection/investigative regime required.  This is understood but not yet addressed by the AGO, and is related to the second issue:

2.2.2    Honestly Assessing the Inadequacies in the AGO’s Physical and Human Resources.  This has been done by AGO internal assessments, as well as the AGO’s three international advisors from the Italian Justice Project Office (IJPO), Justice Sector Support Program of US State INL (JSSP), and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

2.2.3    Recognizing Weakness in Technical and Policy-Making Capacity.  Senior management has recognized the AGO’s capacity limitations.  This has helped to reduce institutional resistance to the urgency for structural changes.  International advisors have sought to refer the AGO to Afghan government expertise and resources as part of capacity building efforts.  UNDP’s budget planning support to the AGO has ensured that the AGO budget and planning directorate has been able to submit proposals and obtain approval for additional development, funds to build its new headquarters, some provincial offices, and purchase equipment.  However, these funds remain insufficient to resolve the strategic needs of the AGO.  Moreover, a lack of management skills hinders project completion, which is linked to development budget allocation.

2.2.4    Unity of Purpose on the Strategic Approach Shared by the AGO International Advisors, avoiding donor duplication and allowing efficient coordination.  Starting in July 2005 there have been three international advisors at the AGO from the IJPO, JSSP, and UNDP, all of whom have been working under the direction of the Attorney General and his deputies.  The advisors have been coordinating among themselves on strategy, AGO reorganization and restructuring, criminal law reform, ethics and discipline, infrastructure needs, and training.  The collaboration among the embedded advisors provides the AGO with deliberated and consensus-driven technical support with resources devoted to priorities.  This international collaboration enabled the AGO and Afghan Prosecutor Association (APA) to join the International Association of Prosecutors (IAP),  to attend the IAP 11th Annual Conference,  and the IAP March 2007 Training Conference on International Legal Assistance.

2.2.5    Institutional Buy-In at Senior Management Level.  Lessons learned include the necessity for institutional buy-in at senior management level, and effective communication of initiatives at lower levels.  Thus, any technical advice is reviewed among the three international advisors and is discussed with senior management at the AGO until there is an AGO consensus.  Only then does the advice go forward to implementation.  

2.2.6    AGO and senior management are “leading change” initiative.  This initiative means that the AGO recognizes the need to lead implementation of its strategy of transformation.  This involves empowering mid-level managers and prosecutors to take the initiative and to make decisions.  It also requires development of leadership qualities.  This is demonstrated by the AGO’s recognition of and support to the APA.  It is also illustrated by the AGO designing and launching a new Stage Course on February 20t, 2007.  It is being taught by Afghans with some financial assistance from JSSP, with future technical and financial assistance requested by the AGO.  

2.2.7    Leadership and strategy development has been promoted by AGO leaders.  Workshops pioneered by UNDP have provided the basis for baseline organizational culture overview.  This means understanding how decision-making really works at the AGO HQ. The whole AGO institution needs to own its strategy otherwise there will be resistance and inertia. The workshops allow the design of communication and buy-in strategies for ownership by lower level prosecutors, and prepare mid-level and junior prosecutors for a role in strategy implementation.  Over 200 junior and mid-level managers participated in these workshops.  These interactive sessions have enabled international advisors to view the problems and issues in a controlled environment from the perspective of junior and middle management.  These workshops were followed by intense one-on-one interactions with a number of identified AGO members, some of whom have now come into senior management positions.  This has contributed to buy-in for future management improvement efforts.
 
2.2.8    Among the identified issues is the necessity for management and implementation strategies to achieve the desired goals.  The following management strategies have been deduced from several strategy meetings among all international advisors and all senior managers at the AGO.  The AGO is a centralized organ and as such must have one holistic and integrated strategy at all levels.  This integrated strategy requires:

2.2.8.1    two key strategic components of achieving the professional, integrity and credibility goals  -- developing human resources and improving coordination among law enforcement agencies;
2.2.8.2    a fundamental shift in prosecutorial operations where the crimes of anti-corruption, counter-narcotics, and terrorism are involved.  Reactive prosecution does not sufficiently enhance public safety and welfare with these crimes.  Reactive investigation will often fail to amass sufficient evidence of these complex organized crimes.  Accordingly, the “reactive” and passive prosecutor organizational culture and processes must be enhanced with “proactive” organizational culture and processes;
2.2.8.3    a service-oriented approach to prosecution with concern for victims, witnesses (protection) and the rights of the accused;
2.2.8.4    implementing information management and office technology improvements as a necessary condition required to implement the constitutional and legal mandates;
2.2.8.5    implementing accurate and complete data collection, reporting, and analysis strategy to inform policy- and decision-making;
2.2.8.6    resource and process management to ensure that public funds are spent in a cost effective manner while avoiding corruption or waste through oversight provided by technical and administrative process review;
2.2.8.7    police-prosecutor collaboration.  This is integral to any change effort and critical to the success of proactive investigative methods that lead to successful prosecutions.

2.3    Analysis of Constraints, Restraints and Assumptions
2.3.1    A. Regulatory and Governance Environment

1. Summarize the major regulations/procedures guiding your sector.  These include both legislation and overall government policies for the sector.

Major Laws and Regulations for the Justice Sector:
Article 134 of the 2004 Afghan Constitution provides the constitutional mandate for the AGO.  The 1991 Law on the Structure and Organization of the AGO is the legal framework and is out of date vis-a-vis the current structure of the AGO.  The 2004 Constitution at Chapter Two, the 2004 Interim (Criminal) Procedure Code for Courts (ICPC); the 1965 Criminal Procedure Code as amended in 1974 (1974CPC); the 2005 Police Law; the 2005 Counter-Narcotics Law; the 1978 Law on Discovery and Investigation; and the Law on Crimes Against External and Internal Security all apply in varying degrees to the criminal procedures that must be followed by the AGO.  This mix is further stirred by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 9 and 14, as made directly applicable by Article 7 of the Constitution.  As a result, Afghanistan’s procedure is now a mélange of confusing codes and laws, all of which apply in whole or part, overlapping each other and resulting in confusion and arbitrary application.  Moreover, the current Interim Criminal Procedure Code contains unrealistic and impractical time limits for investigation and trials.  Nor does the ICPC state the criteria and standards required by applicable human rights instruments for pre-and post-trial detentions and other state action infringing on fundamental human rights of dignity and privacy protected by the Constitution.  As a result, the effectiveness and efficiency of monitoring, investigation, and prosecution suffers greatly.

Other International Conventions, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), oblige the AGO to ensure a lack of discrimination against women.  This includes the prosecutors as well as suspects, accused, victims, and detainees.  Emerging issues include harmonizing all Afghan laws to comply with the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).  The Rome Statute (International Criminal Court) also obliges Afghanistan to enact implementing legislation.  This is a major criminal justice undertaking with far-reaching ramifications for criminal justice related laws, including the “great codes.”

The current Law on the Structure and Organization of the AGO is from 1991 and considered applicable due to the current government’s rejection of the later Taliban decree on the AGO.  However, the AGO must fulfill its new 2004 Constitutional mandate for investigation and prosecution and legal mandate for monitoring, with competencies and organizational structures not contained within the 1991 law.  The current 1991 Law perpetuates the overly-cumbersome top-down management and structure of the AGO from the communist 1980s.  Moreover, it does not allow vertical integration of prosecution (and thus the current Counter-Narcotics Department), sufficient delegation of review authority, or specialization by investigating prosecutors or trial prosecutors.  Proper emphasis has not been placed upon a combined department for the related areas of (1) internal inspection and ethics with set procedures for investigation, discipline, termination, and appeals, (2) hiring, transfer, and promotion, and (3) training and education.  The 1991 law’s procedures for promotion, transfer, and termination allow improper discretion.  More importantly, it fails to incorporate international norms and standards of human rights, including those of suspects and victims.  The 1991 law does not contain normative standards of professionalism and ethics -- including prosecutor obligations to seek the truth and refuse to use illegally-obtained evidence and torture, and transparent disciplinary procedures for prosecutors.  The complete absence of an ethics and professionalism code allows preconditions for corruption to flourish.  A new law on the AGO is being drafted and will be completed and delivered to the Ministry of Justice’s Taqnin by the end of June 2007.  

The new AGO Law draft states in detail the roles and functions of new specialized departments and divisions, including departments and divisions for Anti-Corruption, Gross Violations of Human Rights, Extradition and International Legal Assistance, and a division to investigate and adjudicate ethical violations.  The law will also include protections of prosecutorial independence, and transparent procedures for discipline, transfer, promotion and termination.  New positions that also need consideration include a professional secretary general or “front office” operations manager for the Attorney General.  This position may also be combined with a technical role, thus making it the equivalent to a Principal Deputy Attorney General.  This is not only consistent with ANDS and IARCSC reform strategies and mandates, it also facilitates the effective and professional operation of the AGO.

2. Major Procedures for the Justice Sector:   The Government’s 2005 “Justice For All” sector strategy provided the initial strategic framework for justice development.  However, implementation has been fragmentary due in part to the lack of coordination among donors in the justice sector.  In addition, limited data is available from the institutions on use of resources and support provided by donors.  An example is the use and allocation of space provided to each Permanent Justice Institution in the Integrated Justice Facilities built by donors in the provinces.  Some prosecutors without offices in various provinces are unaware that new buildings have been built and have yet to be allocated space in these premises.
 
Role and sector confusion exists between law enforcement agencies, special agencies, and the AGO.  This is the result of some of the legislation described above.  There is also inadequate uniformity and coordination between the AGO and MOI on investigations, the AGO and Ministry of Justice (MOJ) on detainees and prisons, and among the AGO, MOI, MOJ, the Supreme Court, and lower courts on interpretations of the applicable law.  There is even a lack of uniformity among the AGO’s provincial prosecutor’s offices, as well as on referrals to and the scope of the informal non-state justice system.  It is necessary to connect the AGO’s competencies and activities across the various pillars and cross-cutting themes in the ANDS.  The AGO is making efforts to better its coordination with other justice and law enforcement agencies within the Afghan Government.

The ANDS Security and Rule of Law Pillars should be interpreted to provide a procedure for the justice sector to improve police-prosecutor coordination through collaboration on cases during investigations.  This is a key strategic concern required in both the security and rule of law pillars.   The AGO, though primarily a rule of law actor, operates at the juncture of security and governance pillars.  Cross-cutting issues of corruption, narcotics, regional cooperation, and gender all involve investigative, monitoring, and prosecutorial functions that only the AGO is constitutionally and legally mandated to perform.  There is, therefore, an urgent need for the AGO to improve its competence in these areas and to acquire specialized skills.  The required subject matter and process expertise is critical to successful implementation of these functions, as well as the attainment of these benchmarks and pillars.  The AGO has begun this process.  As discussed above, the AGO and Ministry of Interior have agreed to form a Commission to draft joint guidelines to enable better police-prosecutor collaboration.  The AG has instructed his prosecutors to work closely with the judicial police during investigations.

Another bureaucratic and inertia-driven procedure is reactive investigations, as discussed previously.  Prosecutors and interrogators usually perceive their role as inherently reactive, and view their primary responsibility as responding when a crime is committed, detected by the police, and then reported to the AGO after an arrest is made.  The current structure of the Attorney General is designed to act as a deterrent to crime by swiftly capturing, prosecuting, and punishing criminals.  This perspective does not take into account proactive procedures that could lead to decreased corruption as well as increased public safety and, by implication, national security.  

While the AGO, under its new Attorney General, has taken the lead on proactive corruption investigations, albeit with inadequately trained and resourced prosecutors, the current procedures require significant capacity increases.  As for public safety, technology and emerging threats mean that law enforcement officials, including prosecutors, could track and interdict criminal activity at the source and often before commission.  This is necessary because waiting for terrorist acts to occur puts a great number of lives in danger and compromises public safety.  In the case of violence against women, experience around the world demonstrates that interdiction and dynamic prosecution early on in the cycle of violence reduces the risk of further injuries and fatalities.

The strategic framework and policy-making orientation derived from ANDS must be flexible enough to allow the AGO significant latitude in developing strategies that operate within both the Security Pillar and Governance Pillar.  Without this, police and prosecutor coordination cannot be improved.  Effective adaptation of tactics and strategies to meet emerging public safety and national security threats and promote the rule of law may be compromised.  This AGO strategy will operate within both Pillars

3. What impact does compliance or non-compliance with the regulatory environment have on progress in the sector?
Significant progress toward the delivery of credible justice will require a revision and harmonization of the criminal procedure codes and laws currently in effect.  Accordingly, the confusion and lack of uniformity results in non-compliance with the criminal procedure laws, resulting in a lack of justice and violations of the fundamental human rights of fair trial, as well as arbitrary and illegal detention.  The current criminal procedure and the 1991 Law on AGO, if fully complied with, will prevent effective and efficient investigations, monitoring and prosecutions.  The “impact” is avoidable failures to convict those who can be proven guilty.  A related “impact” is that the prosecutor dismisses cases against those that should be indicted or convicted according to the evidence that would otherwise be available to effective, efficient and impartial investigators.  The current regulatory environment also limits the ability of prosecutors to cooperate and coordinate with other law enforcement agencies, and provides a culture and sense of jurisdiction and boundaries that hinders effective investigation and performance.  The draft Criminal Procedure Code and Law on AGO that will be before the Taqnin in 2007, if properly revised, can provide the answer to these problems.

Moreover, new laws enacted before the National Assembly became empowered are encroaching on existing AGO mandates, resulting in tensions with newly created executive agencies.  In addition, the specialized agencies so created are the subject of donor attention, which diverts resources that could be provided to the AGO.  An example of both problems is the General Independent Anti-Bribery and Corruption Commission (GIACC).  GIACC claims that its establishing law provides it with investigative authority that is provided in the AGO’s constitutional mandate.  The AGO does not agree.  Article 134 of the Constitution is clear, while the GIACC establishing law is ambiguous and must be interpreted to avoid Constitutional conflict.  Moreover, Chapter 11 of the UN Convention Against Corruption name the AGO and Supreme Court as the critical national agencies in the fight against corruption.  Reconciling these potential regulatory and statutory conflicts to eliminate confusion and ambiguity is essential for effectively combating emerging crimes.
 
2.3.2.  B. Capacity Analysis :

The current capacity of the AGO, while improving, still has some distance to go before it reaches even minimal proficiency.  It does not yet have the competency to perform its constitutional and legal mandates.

The definition of capacity must be divided further into (1) the capacity of the AGO to perform its functions, (2) the capacity to hire, educate, train, supervise, discipline, professionalize, and make ethical its prosecutors, and (3) the capacity to properly pay, equip, and provide offices for its prosecutors.  The AGO must not only gain the capacity to perform its legal functions, but it must have the capacity to ensure its continuing ability to perform those functions over the years, eventually without depending upon international technical assistance.   For example, prosecutor training over the last three years through August 2006 had been provided by IDLO, using its own premises and instructors, including international instructors flown in for 4-8 weeks to teach the Afghan criminal procedure and penal codes.  In the meantime, the AGO was conducting no classes of its own.  The AGO did not have a Stage course for incoming prosecutors, nor did it conduct continuing legal education training.  It had no teaching equipment, curriculum, lecture notes, or classroom handout materials.  It did not have a library for its prosecutors or the ability to provide them with the essential applicable criminal laws.  The Attorney General has now made the Stage Course his highest priority.  The AG believes it is essential that the AGO build its capacity to teach its own prosecutors.  This should be done with the minimum of international instructors, using them only in those areas unknown or unfamiliar to AGO prosecutor trainers.  Examples of this limited group include international laws and human rights, ethics and professionalism, methodology of legal interpretation, and the building of investigation cases involving corruption and narcotics.

The lack of capacity at the AGO to effectively investigate, monitor and prosecute crimes stems from a number of reasons, including:

2.3.2.1.    Prosecutors do not have university degrees in law or sharia.  Particularly in the provinces, the majority of prosecutors do not have university degrees in law or sharia.
2.3.2.2.    Prosecutors do not have a Stage Course to provide prosecutor-ready training.  The Stage Course has recently re-started in March 2007 after a hiatus of 3 years.  Before 2004 there was a hiatus of over a decade.  Accordingly, there is a large backlog of prosecutors who need such education.
2.3.2.3.    Prosecutors do not have continuing legal education training in specialized courses on the law and practice.
2.3.2.4.    Prosecutors are paid an average salary of $60 per month, less than the average Police Officer, and are thus vulnerable to petty corruption.
2.3.2.5.    The AGO does not have a transparent and objectively based system of hiring, promotion, and transfer.  This allows nepotism and cronyism in hiring and petty corruption to influence hiring and promotion.  It also allows promotion and transfer of insufficiently competent prosecutors.
2.3.2.6.    The AGO does not yet have a Code of Ethical Conduct.  It lacks a transparent and objectively-based disciplinary procedure, thus allowing for unethical conduct in its prosecutors and preconditions for corruption. The AGO is drafting an Ethics Code and new Law on AGO to solve these problems.
2.3.2.7.    The AGO does not have physical infrastructure to adequately perform its competencies.  This results in intense crowding and shared desks, with insufficient offices in working order.  The prosecutors often do not have desks, chairs, paper, folders, communication equipment, vehicles, and law books.  The AGO HQ has no library or central file archive.  
2.3.2.8.    The prosecutors have no publicly-furnished housing or discounted food/dry goods supplements.  The Attorney General has asked donors for assistance in this regard to reduce the incentive for corruption.
2.3.2.9.    The AGO does not have a victim-witness assistance and advocacy program.  This is needed to ensure that necessary testimony is secured for trial and that victim’s rights are protected.
2.3.2.10.    The AGO has neither sufficient security forces nor investigative resources in the provinces to protect its staff.  Active and honest prosecutors are receiving explicit threats against their lives and family, as well as implicit threats and coercive influences by government officials and the powerful.  
2.3.2.11.    The AGO does not have a harmonized and practicable criminal procedure legal framework.  One is needed, with modern prosecutorial tools including covert and technical surveillance, monitoring, and victim protection.  As discussed, the draft CPC is with the Ministry of Justice’s Taqnin.
2.3.2.12.    The AGO does not have a modern Law on Organization and Structure to allow the vertical integration and specialization within the AGO.  As discussed, the draft will soon be with the Ministry of Justice’s Taqnin.


2.3.3.  C. Security Situation

The effective prosecutorial reach of the AGO is limited to those areas with both adequate national security protection and the rule of law.  The security situation requires adequate protection against terrorism.  The general national security situation in the south and east has meant that the ability to prosecute remains scant or non-existent in certain areas.  This is noticeable by the number of prosecutors from certain provinces operating from AGO HQ.  

The absence of rule of law and presence of corruption results in threats to the personal security of honest active prosecutors.  The level of still-existing systemic corruption within the AGO, as well as within the institutions with which the AGO works, limits the effective geographic reach of the AGO to those police stations and courts beholden to the rule of law rather than criminal and provincial power structures.  Patronage and client networks permeate through several provincial justice institutions, hampering efforts for reform.  These networks are supported by power elites that seem to use implicit coercive influence as well as explicit threats to control prosecutorial and judicial decision-making.  This also raises issues of personal security for prosecutors in parts of the country that are not considered a major security risk.  

In order to achieve results, personal security for prosecutors must be improved.  Regulatory changes may include providing close protection to prosecutors and their family.  This should be a priority for senior prosecutors and prosecutors for corruption, narcotics, and other special crimes.  Protection should include armoured cars and guards, with hardened security in justice institution facilities.  The ability of prosecutors to investigate without fear is compromised if security is a paramount concern in performing the investigating, monitoring, or prosecuting function.  The ability of foreign experts to provide international support and assistance in security is limited, with the exception of providing funds to harden sites and purchase armoured vehicles, and to train and pay guards and drivers.  JSSP/INL has provided three armoured cars to the Attorney General’s Office and is training AGO bodyguards, drivers, and building security.  

SECTION THREE :  STRATEGY
Overall Strategy for Achieving Expected Results
3.    Given the contextual analysis in Section Two, how do you plan to achieve your expected results? What strategies do you propose?  

The AGO proposes Strategies in conjunction with the ANDS Governance and Rule of Law Benchmarks:

3.1.    Reform to strengthen professionalism, integrity, and credibility of the Human Resources of the AGO

3.1.1.    Professionalism – Strategies to Get There.  Being professional is defined as “characterized by or conforming to the technical or ethical standards of a profession, and exhibiting a courteous, conscientious, and generally businesslike manner in the workplace.”  Professional development can be attained through a mix of qualified hiring, Stage education, continuing legal training and specialization, and performance management.  Technical proficiency can be acquired by learning through classes, mentoring, and “on the job” specialized skills in and for specialized departments and divisions.

3.1.1.1.    Professional development strategies involve first setting minimum competence standards for recruitment of entry level prosecutors, including passing a redesigned Stage Course.  Second, requiring continuing legal education and training to provide specialization and skills development, support prosecutors and managers in developing case analysis and presentation skills, and updating operational skills.  Third, putting into place performance criteria and incentives that are linked to career development, increased remuneration, and job security.

3.1.1.2.    An interim strategy for the transition from the existing workforce of mixed professionals and non-professionals into a new workforce of professionals involves educating and training current prosecutors, particularly at the provincial level.  The training will enable them to acquire basic levels of general proficiency in investigative, monitoring, and prosecutorial skills.

3.1.1.3.    Management and support staff professional development strategies include training on file and case development and investigation by prosecutorial support staff.  This is particularly needed in case and schedule management, and to encourage prosecutors to delegate to and supervise the judicial police.  Advanced skills development and acquisition will include classes on human resource, finance, budget and procurement management, as well as on library and information management.

3.1.1.4.    Timely publication and distribution of the Saranwal (prosecutor) Law Journal will be made, with contributions from national and international authors on legal issues including professionalism and ethics.

3.1.1.5.    The ANDS gender mainstreaming benchmark requires that at least 30% of prosecutors be women.  This will be accomplished while improving competence levels through increased training and competitive selection strategies.  Outreach to women law students for “internships,” to women law graduates and lawyers, and use of affirmative action in hiring and promotion must be a priority.

3.1.1.6.    Specialized and professional (technical) proficiency is a necessary precondition to implementing the strategy for organizational redesign and specialization.  At minimum this proficiency must be gained simultaneously with specialization.  This strategy proposes accelerating specialization at AGO HQ and at the provincial prosecutor’s offices through dynamic and intensive vocational and academic training programs for prosecutors selected in each specialized area.  International training and exposure is also a component of this strategy and will include sponsoring the most promising specialized candidates for outside-of-Afghanistan opportunities to enhance their skills with foreign LL.M. or Ph.D. degrees.

3.1.1.7.    Technical professionalism is incomplete without leadership, management, budgeting, and planning skills.  In order to improve implementation, AGO will engage in leadership, management, and budget/planning skills development.  Best use will leverage existing programs, such as UNDP’s Civil Service leadership programme.  The need for senior managers to be aware of the full resource implications of this strategic plan is critical.  Aligning resources with activities and knowing how to do this in a way that supports the implementation of this strategy will lead to achieving the expected results.

3.1.2.    Integrity – Strategies to Get There.  Integrity can be defined as “firm adherence to a code of moral and ethical values; being incorruptible.”  In order to achieve integrity, there must be consistency, purity, and wholeness in the criminal justice system.  Qur’an 16:90 “Allah bids justice and good.”

3.1.2.1.    The AGO will have an Ethics Code of Conduct by August 2007.  This will provide an objective standard and guidance to prosecutors on conduct that is not criminal but nonetheless the first step leading to corruption.

3.1.2.2.    The AGO will have procedures and organizational institutions to accept complaints (anonymous as well as signed) from the public and from defense attorneys.  It will also have procedures and trained staff to investigate and present a case of unethical conduct by a prosecutor.  The AGO will adjudicate hearings and appeals and impose sanctions for violations of the Ethics Code of Conduct.

3.1.2.3.    Integrity will also result from education and training in ethics and standards, including civil service ethics.  Training on Ethics and Professionalism will be provided by the AGO with international assistance to improve prosecutor understanding and adherence to standards

3.1.2.4.    The new AGO Division of Professional Standards and Discipline will have as Director (Raees) the Inspector General (IG).  The IG will inculcate a culture of ethical conduct using the highest vigilance in implementing the highest ethical standards.  The new Ethics Code of Conduct will be implemented by the IG, whose staff will be taking complaints upon, investigate, and present ethical charges against prosecutors.  The Professional Standards Division will also maintain and improve ethical standards and further develop the AGO ethics policy.  An internal AGO Ethics Committee will resolve ethical controversies and provide direction on ethical dilemmas.

3.1.2.5.    Facilitative support to develop capacity of the Afghan Prosecutor’s Association will provide alternative forums for developing and maintaining professional and ethical conduct standards.

3.1.2.6.    Integrity will also result in part from the increase in professionalism of the prosecutors, along with an increase in salaries and benefits.

3.1.3.    Credibility – Strategies to Get There.  Credibility can be defined as “the ability to inspire belief or trust.”  Qur’an 9:71: “Believing men and women are protectors of each other, enjoining the good and forbidding the evil. “  Each member in an Islamic society has a criminal justice responsibility, with the AGO leading and defending the public.  Strategies will be designed to ensure that victims, witnesses, and the public at large will trust that the AGO to provide them with impartial and effective justice.

3.1.3.1.    The public perception that the AGO has integrity and is professional will increase the AGO’s credibility.  This perception will grow as the victims, witnesses, and Afghan people trust it to do justice in an ethical and professional manner.  The credibility regarding justice may be defined as the perception of:

3.1.3.1.1.    fair and impartial treatment of suspects and accused;
3.1.3.1.2.    fair and impartial treatment of victims of crime and witnesses, including assistance, support , and protection;
3.1.3.1.3.    fair and impartial provision of justice in investigations and trials, including a willingness to provide liberty and dismissals to the innocent, to strongly prosecute the guilty including those with power in Afghan society, and to do so effectively and efficiently.

3.1.3.2.    The AGO will develop a Media (Public Relations) Unit as part of the Attorney General’s front office.  That Unit will develop and implement public awareness campaigns on the AGO’s role in the justice system and public participation in the justice system, utilizing print, radio, and television media.  In addition, public outreach programs for legal literacy will be developed and implemented by prosecutors and the Afghanistan Prosecutors Association.

3.1.3.3.    The AGO strategy for improving public awareness and confidence in the prosecution service will start with communication of the AGO’s mandate to Afghan citizens.  The strategy will include:

3.1.3.3.1.    greater openness to dispel inaccurate and false reporting;
3.1.3.3.2.    greater openness demonstrating a readiness to explain investigative and prosecuting decisions;
3.1.3.3.3.    regular surveys and reporting on crime, prosecution and investigations to keep the public informed;
3.1.3.3.4.    being closer to the public by placing prosecutors in as many districts as possible along with AGO HQ-written materials for distribution;
3.1.3.3.5.    regular surveys of public perception will be conducted and analyzed to improve AGO outreach.  Information technology shall form an important part of implementing the communications strategy.

3.1.3.4.    The growth of the Afghan Prosecutors’ Association (APA) will be an integral part of executing the AGO’s communication and public relations strategy.  The APA role will be, in part, as representatives of the prosecution service in the community, with programs such as “adopt a high school.”

3.1.3.5.    A public complaints strategy (both signed and anonymous) will be developed by the new Professional Standards and Discipline (IG) Division.  That strategy will provide opportunity for public feedback on prosecutorial performance, and increase the credibility of the AGO. Special attention will be paid to accessibility for women.  Pilot projects will be developed in provinces to ensure safety and security for complainants.

3.2.    Infrastructure Construction, Purchase and Rehabilitation (Physical Assets and Resources)
The AGO’s human resource needs (professionalism) are followed by the AGO’s organizational restructuring needs (functioning institutions) for the reforms to be sustainable.  Capacity to execute the mandate must be met with adequate physical and infrastructural resources.  The AGO’s resource strategy includes the following:

3.2.1.    Buildings strategy – completing construction of the AGO HQ in Kabul (Darlaman) by mid-2008.  This project is a priority and required for the capacity-building concurrently being done through the creation of the many specialized prosecuting departments, divisions, and units.  The AGO’s Kabul Provincial Prosecutor’s Office infrastructure is in great need of repair and renovation, and needs greater space allocation.  This strategy will require:
3.2.1.1.    Construction of offices in all major provinces and most smaller provinces by 2012.
3.2.1.2.    Renovation of all existing buildings in provinces and at sub-provincial levels by 2012.
3.2.1.3.    Occupation of office space in existing AGO HQ buildings that may have been vacated by the AGO HQ by the end of 2008 when moving into the new permanent AGO HQ buildings.
3.2.1.4.    Allocation of space within completed Integrated Justice Facilities (constructed by Italy, USA and UNDP).
3.2.1.5.    Project management, completion, and moving in and out will be executed through project management teams of staff who have received subject matter training in the field.
3.2.1.6.    Sub-provincial presence that is currently not uniform is a longer-term strategic aim and depends upon the security situation.  However, if adequate vehicles are available to transport prosecutors for day visits to sub-provincial levels, such transport assets will, on a temporary basis, reduce the need for building infrastructure at all sub-provincial locations.

3.2.2.    Equipment and Furniture: AGO strategy for equipment and furniture begins with improved expertise in procurement processes, and finance and project management for administrative staff.  Basic needs analysis of the same, as well as for consumable supplies at all levels of the AGO, will also occur.  
3.2.2.1.    The AGO strategy is to request external donor assistance to fund or supply major equipment and furniture, including vehicles that are assessed as priority needs by AGO management teams.  This strategy will take into consideration non-binding consultation with international donors/advisors.
3.2.2.2.    Provision of such equipment and furniture will be synchronized with the strategy for buildings above.  For example, the completion of the AGO HQ will require donors to assist in the providing infrastructural equipment – electrical generators; secure communications and information and communication technology architecture; copying and printing materials; archive and data processing; furniture and fixtures – (e.g., conference facilities, desks and chairs).  Some of this will be later transferred from the temporary AGO HQ Annex being leased, furnished and equipped by JSSP.  The AGO HQ Annex will be occupied by the AG and some of his HQ departments and divisions by June 2007.
3.2.2.3.    Another priority for the AGO is implementation of the existing management information strategy to establish the Management Information Systems (MIS) division within the AGO.  This strategy involves infrastructure and internet-based connectivity.  It requires not only the equipment, including wiring and wireless, but additional Information Technology (IT) staffing.  IT staff will include a database manager, website manager, information and communications technology manager, GIS (geo-spatial criminal statistics) operator, and an MIS Manager.  This will enable the AGO to coordinate with the Ministry of Interior, thus enabling the AGO to centralize complex criminal investigations.  GIS can more accurately track caseload and criminal activity countrywide.
3.2.2.4.    The National Legal Training Centre (NLTC) will be considered in the AGO training strategy.  However, the advantage of providing of space and equipment for training of prosecutors must be balanced against the NLTC’s disadvantages of distance and student/instructor travel-time vis-à-vis training in situ at the AGO HQ and Kabul Provincial Offices.  Those AGO facilities, however, are constrained by space limitations. The strategy for training will thus determine a balanced plan to use both locations.
3.2.2.5.    Sustainable procurement and supply of consumables is essential.  This includes paper, pens, file folders, firewood, printing and copying toner cartridges, light bulbs, and generator fuel.

3.2.3.    Transportation Needs and Vehicles:  The mandate of the AGO requires vehicles for HQ.  Those vehicles are needed for inter- and intra-provincial travel, and for intra-district travel.  Inter-provincial travel includes provincial office communications and data-sharing with AGO HQ, and for specialized HQ teams to travel to the provinces for investigations and trials.  Intra-provincial travel includes for witnesses and victims in districts to attend investigations and trials at provincial offices, for provincial prosecutors to travel to districts, and for district prosecutors to travel to the provincial prosecutor’s office.  Intra-district travel includes for prosecutors to take and preserve witness and victim testimony in investigations, and for prosecutors to attend crime scenes.
3.2.3.1.    Current transportation modes:  The AGO HQ has a number of buses, Sports Utility Vehicles (SUVs or jeeps), sedan cars, and bicycles.  The AG himself has two JSSP-donated armoured cars for personal protection.  One Chief Provincial Prosecutor under explicit threat has a JSSP-donated armoured car.  Some Provincial Prosecutor Offices have a few cars while others do not.  District-based prosecutors do not have vehicles.  Overall the prosecutors must rely upon the police and even victims’ private vehicles for transportation.  One major exception is the few AGO HQ special divisions or units that have access to vehicles.  The CJTF is unusually well-resourced in this regard.  Certain major provincial chief prosecutors and counter-narcotics and anti-corruption prosecutors on sensitive cases should also have armoured cars for protection, as do a few selected AGO HQ Deputy AGs and Division Directors (Raees).  Some individual prosecutors in the provinces with especially sensitive cases and who have received threats should at least have some temporary protection.  The AGO needs should be compared with the Ministry of Interior’s recent acceptance of thousands of donor-provided vehicles.
3.2.3.2.    The AGO transportation strategy requires donor assistance for a two phased approach, beginning with acquisition of the right number of the right vehicles to be assigned to the right provinces in the right order.  Phase 1 includes a combination of buses, SUVs, sedans, motorcycles, and bicycles.  Phase 2 involves maintenance and amortization of these transportation modes.  Maintenance includes protocols on use and sanctions for misuse of government property.  Amortization of vehicles ensures that government’s projected expectations of the useful life of the vehicles is reached or exceeded, and that replacement vehicles are phased in as the current stock comes to the end of its useful life.
3.2.3.3.    Infrastructure and equipment resource provision are a mandate enabler.  This requires making the right equipment, space, and tools available.  This includes the implementation of the human and due process rights of suspects and the accused, victims, and witnesses.  The AGO mandate also requires it to ensure the integrity, effectiveness, and efficiency of the investigative, monitoring, and trial processes of the AGO.

3.3.    Functioning institutions in all provinces of Afghanistan:  The implementation of the above strategies for professional development, integrity, and credibility, together with infrastructure, cannot be achieved by the AGO as currently structured.  Therefore, AGO strategy requires major organizational changes that include introducing specialized units at HQ level, a greater degree of central specialization at the provincial level, and a reorganization of the AGO at district levels.  This reorganization will be consistent with the Government’s administrative boundaries, AGO human, physical, and infrastructural resources, the geographic distance of the districts, population concentrations, and the levels and severity of criminal activity.  In addition, existing working methodology and procedures will be redesigned to streamline and integrate the investigative, monitoring, and trial phases of the criminal justice process.  This will be done while interfacing more closely with other justice sector actors including the police, Courts, and Ministry of Justice.
3.3.1.    “Integration strategy” involves redesigning the AGO’s processes required by its mandates of investigation, monitoring, and prosecuting.  This redesign will integrate those functions within one specialized prosecuting unit at the department, division, or smaller unit levels.  Integration will also involve redesign and updating of case management systems, work procedures, and protocols.  This will preserve the separation of investigative and prosecuting functions required by the impartiality of the investigative role.  It will also allow involving a single prosecutor or prosecuting team in functions where context allows, or teamwork is necessary.  This contrasts with pure horizontal prosecution, where separate departments perform investigative and prosecutorial functions.  The integrated approach to prosecutions seeks to maintain the effectiveness of the horizontal prosecution approach, while adding the efficiency and continuity of the vertical prosecution approach.  
3.3.2.    The strategy changes regarding organization and functionality are initially and primarily aimed at AGO HQ, given that prosecutorial resources are more effective at central level and the AGO is a central organization.  Moreover, internal integrity and professionalism checks will be more effective at first at the HQ.  However, as greater integrity permeates the AGO institution, integrity strategy coupled with improved provincial and sub-provincial prosecutorial competence and performance will allow specialized units to be extended to the provincial level.  This strategy is characterized by the IG, revised recruitment, promotion, transfer, discipline procedures, and training,
3.3.3.    Given the current low level of capacity and resources at provincial and sub-provincial level, the strategy will provide training to prosecutors at the provincial level through provincial training teams, including long-term resident, embedded provincial prosecutor international advisors.
3.3.4.    At HQ level a comprehensive organizational restructuring plan to execute the specialization and integration strategy has been approved by the AG and also received commendation from international donors.  This will be implemented in phases.
3.3.4.1.    The first phase will establish the highest priority specialized units.  Some of these are already in de facto and de jure operation, albeit not yet authorized by the 1991 Law on AGO, including the following:
3.3.4.1.1.    A Professional Standards and Discipline (internal affairs) Division, headed by the Inspector General.  This will not only investigate unethical conduct, but will set standards and review compliance and qualifications for, and approval of, recruitment, promotion, transfer, discipline, and termination.  This Division will be within a Department of Training, Evaluation, and Inspection, which will also encompass the Training and Education Division.  The Deputy AG in charge of the Department will thus be charged with the total professionalism, integrity and credibility of Afghan prosecutors.
3.3.4.1.2.    Departments for Anti-Corruption and Counter-Narcotics.  While the Counter-Narcotics Department is, de facto, fully established and functioning along with the CJTF, it is not a de jure part of the 1991 Law on AGO.  
3.3.4.1.3.    The Office of a Principal Deputy Attorney General will be created to be responsible for day-to-day AGO operations and establish a “front office” for the Attorney General.  These changes will facilitate and streamline decision-making, and set the stage for implementing the strategy of specialization.  
3.3.4.1.4.    A Department of Cassation (or Solicitor General) will be created to set AGO policy and coordinate submissions and decisions on all final appellate procedures.  This will include issues of constitutional and statutory interpretation and first impression in the Supreme Court.
3.3.4.2.    In the second phase, special divisions will be established and other divisions will be reviewed and redesigned to address emerging criminal activities and threats.
3.3.4.2.1.    A special prosecutions division will be established.  Its competency will include an international unit for advising and investigating International Legal Assistance, extradition and surrendering issues.  (This meets the ANDS Regional Cooperation Benchmark).
3.3.4.2.2.    A violation of gross human rights division will be established.  Its competency will include assistance in peace-building, national reconciliation and investigating allegations of gross human rights abuses pursuant to the national strategy.  The recent “immunity” resolution from the National Assembly does not affect possible investigations, and certainly not if the family of the victims wish them to proceed.
3.3.4.2.3.    A counter-terrorism division will be established to assist in the fight against terrorism.
3.3.4.2.4.    A Special Victims Unit (SVU) will be established in provincial prosecutor offices to investigate and prosecute gender-based violence and family related offenses, as well as politically or ethnically-motivated crime.  These will be crimes against persons, not corruption, narcotics or national security crimes.  In AGO HQ a Special Victims Division (of the Department of Special Prosecutions) will be established to monitor and guide the provincial SVUs, and where necessary and appropriate the SVD will take over, investigate and prosecute those cases that are beyond provincial capacity.
3.3.4.2.5.    In support of the special victims’ crimes division, as well as for the needs of all witnesses and victims, a special victim-witness support division will be established in the department of administration and support services with international donor assistance.
3.3.4.2.5.1.    This support division will implement a victim-witness program.  That program will advise, assist, and compensate victims of crime, provide assistance to victims, witnesses, and affected family to understand the investigation and court process, and to attend court.  This program will also have victim advocates on its staff and supporting legislation.  Significant donor support will be needed.  The UN-established Victim Witness Program in Kosovo may serve as a model.
Implementation of the justice components of NAPWA and EVAW are part of this victim and witness strategy.  Providing specialist support will make the criminal justice system more accessible to women.  
3.3.4.2.5.2.    Close cooperation with women’s shelters, NGOs, and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs will be an integral part of this strategy.  This will ensure gender justice for women and juvenile victims, as well as for women and juvenile suspects and accused.
3.3.4.2.6.    The AGO will also create, in the department of administration and support services, a prosecutor protection unit with threat-evaluation and close protection (armed or “bodyguard” protection) competencies, in coordination with Ministry of Interior and National Directorate for Security (NDS) intelligence and armed protection units.
3.3.4.2.7.    The AGO strategy will also propose, and with donor support implement, a specialized HQ division supporting an anti-corruption judicial chamber or division seated in Kabul (or within the Kabul Provincial Appellate Court).  This is necessary in light of the coercive influence that provincial criminal power structures use to control the judicial sector, especially in corruption or narcotics cases, and their effective threats against judge and prosecutor safety.  This proposed judicial unit would provide a legally-defined nationwide jurisdiction for specific government corruption cases that provincial police, prosecution offices, and courts do not have sufficient capacity to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate effectively and fairly.
3.3.5.    Implementation and evaluation of Phases One and Two will occur before Phases 3 and 4 are executed.
3.3.6.    The recruitment strategy to initially staff these departments and divisions will involve a four-stage selection process:  (1) competitive assessment, (2) selection of best performers for interview, (3) second specialization assessment (related to the field of activity) and (4) psychometric testing.
3.3.7.    Phase three will include implementation and roll-out of the Management Information Systems (MIS) and information system support division within the AGO.  This includes the establishment of library and archive facilities at AGO HQ and in at least 3 of the major provinces by the end of 2008, and all major provinces by end of 2009.  It also will require dissemination of copies of all applicable criminal and procedure laws and codes to all prosecutors by mid-2008 (JSSP is requesting funding for this purpose).
3.3.8.    Staff training for non-prosecutors will be instituted, including:
3.3.8.1.    recruiting and training professional administrators and technical support;
3.3.8.2.    a paralegal training and development program to increase technical capacity for litigation;
3.3.8.3.    a program to allow law and sharia faculty students to “intern” and assist prosecutors while providing exposure to the practice of the AGO.  This may require legal changes in the Law on AGO and will require consent of the law faculties.  This will also enable outreach to women students to interest them in prosecution careers.
3.3.9.    The AGO strategy also envisions a well networked and integrated Criminal Justice System with active cooperation among and between other national and international prosecutorial and law enforcement agencies.  International connections and relationships forged though professional memberships in the International Association of Prosecutors, and through participation in international conferences and associations, will be part of this strategy and require international donor assistance.
3.3.10.    Critical to effective and sustainable outcomes of this strategy is a thorough understanding of the resource implications of the AGO strategy.


3.4.    Oversight Relating to Corruption, Lack of Due Process, Miscarriage of Justice Reviewed and Reformed.
3.4.1.    Effective recordkeeping and data analysis are critical to policy development. The institutionalization policymaking and analysis functions of the AGO will be revised in the new Law on the AGO.  That law will expressly define the functions and duties of the High Council, the Division of Study and Research, and other policy-related functionaries in the AGO.
3.4.2.    The Division of Professional Standards (IG), complaint outreach, new Ethics Code of Conduct, and disciplinary procedures will provide transparency in prosecutor actions.
3.4.3.    Improved MIS will increase administrative transparency.  Competitive recruitment and examination of candidates for all AGO posts increases proficiency while reducing corruption.  Effective case management processes will provide strategies to reduce the length of time accused persons are kept in pre-trial detention.  Prosecutor performance criteria will include measures to determine human rights and due process issues.  This will include advising suspects and accused of their rights including their right to counsel provided at no cost, and providing the accused with all evidence against her/him.  Also included will be review of law enforcement and internal AGO prosecutor actions for human rights and due process violations against the suspect and accused, as well as against the interests of victims.
3.4.4.    The AGO will develop inter-agency guidelines and working practices to improve efficiency and effectiveness across the criminal justice chain.  This includes the existing Police-Prosecution Commission Memorandum of Understanding  between the Minister of Interior and the AG that will produce jointly-issued instructions and operating guidelines on police-prosecutor relations and investigation collaboration.  Planned future agreements will include victim and witness management protocols, case and offender management protocols, and mechanisms to monitor recidivist offenders.

3.5.    Organizational Restructuring Strategy Implementation.
3.5.1.    The above strategies, devised for improving performance, will ultimately serve to improve public confidence in the criminal justice system by creating an impartial and independent prosecution service that is not influenced or coerced by powerful elites.  The AGO will then provide an avenue for redress by victims of crime and injustice, many of whom are poor, and for the citizens at large who yearn for peace.  The AG has already begun this strategy by allowing such victims to present petitions three days a week.  A hundred may show up in one day.  Without law and order, there can be no development.  As a result, the cycle of violence and the poverty it breeds cannot be broken.
3.5.2.    Increased economic activity will be supported by public confidence in the laws, public perception of safety, and lower crime rates.  The orderly operation of society is essential for growth-related economic activity to thrive.  In particular, effective anti-corruption prosecution assists in creating a predictable and fair regulatory environment in which to do business.  This is a factor influencing the decision of foreign investors to invest in an economy.  Successful corruption prosecutions of high government officials are much more than symbolic.  They break the cycle of impunity and the false aura of invincibility, re-establish deterrence and punishment, resulting in a reduction of corruption.
3.5.3.    A correlation does exist between poverty and crime.  Improved criminal prosecution leads to increased benefits derived from the rule of law, which in turn provides a stable base for economic development.  Sustained economic growth is closely correlated with poverty alleviation.
3.5.4.    The AGO and its competencies are not just part of the rule of law sector, but also of the security sector.  
3.5.4.1.    While a price cannot be put on public safety and national security, the cost of an effective prosecution service with adequate specialization and modern skills to combat emerging criminal behavior presents a cost-effective use of resources.
3.5.4.2.    The infrastructural, equipment, skills acquisition, and development needs of the AGO are great.  Thirty years of institutional atrophy and near-abolition under the Taliban mean that a new institution is being created. The resources being applied to effectuate the above strategies are a necessity if Afghanistan is to have a modern prosecution service.
3.5.5.    External funding, technical assistance, and resources are essential.  Crime is increasingly a transnational phenomenon.  This is obviously so with narcotics trafficking, trafficking in persons, and money laundering as part of government corruption.  The AGO will accordingly establish a division to manage and make requests for extradition and international legal cooperation.  Thus, the potential and need for external donor funding remains high, with correlative benefits outside of Afghanistan.  
3.5.6.    The current strategy here is the result of a consultative process within the AGO’s senior management.  That process went forward with advice from the AGO international advisors, all of whom have worked with the AGO for over a year and a half, and are thus familiar with the issues involved.  This process was supported extensively and dynamically by the Attorney General, Dr. Abdul Jabar Sabit, and also by the former AG Mahmud Daqiq.  This continuity of policy and increasing political endorsement for reform provides the base for sustained implementation of this transformation.
 


SECTION FOUR : PROGRAMMING
1. The AGO Professional Development Program is comprised of five components.  Three components involve technical prosecution knowledge and skills development.  The fourth inculcates ethical training and awareness.  The fifth component involves management and leadership development for technical staff in supervisory and management positions.  The last component is the salary supplementing to enable prosecutors to meet salary equivalence vis-à-vis the judges and police officers on their level.  I.e., the provincial prosecutor should be paid as much as the chief judge of that province and the chief of police for the province; the chief of investigations in a province should be paid as much as the chief of police for investigations of that province.

Our initial estimates are that the current salary total for all staff, which for year 1385 (2006) is $2,869,229, will be increased to $14,995,147.  A detailed breakdown of salary needs over the next five years is attached as Appendix 3 below.

1.1 The first three components are as follows:
1.1.1. A redesigned and updated induction training (the Stage) course.  Complementing the Stage will be a separate continuing legal education (CLE) training and development program for existing prosecutors in the field.  The CLE will target their specialized needs and positions, using existing and newly designed AGO HQ and National Legal Training Center (NLTC) facilities.
1.1.2. Rigorous recruitment and selection of candidates leading to specialized vocational and academic training of staff in new or redesigned specialized departments, divisions and units.
1.1.3. Developing and deploying mandatory CLE and a professional development program to keep technical staff updated on skills, using existing and newly designed AGO HQ and NLTC facilities.

2. The Organizational Restructuring Program will review and redesign the organizational structures at HQ, provincial and sub-provincial levels.  It will align the design with the AGO’s strategy, mandate, and role in developing Afghanistan and as implementer of Afghan government policy and strategy.  This program comprises various elements, including establishing new departments, divisions, and units detailed above.  These will include the Professional Standards and Education/Training Divisions, the Special Prosecutions Department (containing special victims–EVAW implementation and international units), Anti-Corruption and Financial Crimes Department, the redesigned National Security Department (formerly Military Unit), the redesigned Administrative Department, and a new Cassation (Solicitor General) Department, among others.

3. The Leadership, Management and Resource Strategy Implementation Program provides the heart of support to the AGO in implementing its strategy.  This program’s function is to develop management, planning, analysis and monitoring skills among AGO administrative and technical managers and staff.  This will enable the AGO to effectively plan and execute resource allocation, ensuring that resources allocated yield the results desired.

4. The Law Reform, Policy Analysis and Planning Program is critical to the ability of the AGO to help direct criminal justice policy by providing it with the capacity to analyze, through accurate data collection and reporting, criminal justice trends both in practice and by providing regulations and legislation.  The creation of a Cassation Department will assist the formulation, through appellate practice, of substantive criminal law and procedure and sentencing policy.  Law reform capacity will be enhanced with increased specialization and improved prosecutor proficiency using existing laws.  The AGO High Council’s role in formulating policy will be enhanced under this program, as it will be provided with resources to improve and implement policy.

5. The Management Information Systems (MIS) Program involves all elements of information systems and MIS including libraries, archives, and information and communications technology.  This program will be implemented by Italy, in partnership with USA (JSSP) and other donors.  This program overlaps with the law enforcement and justice sector collaboration program below, and is essential to fulfill the information needs of the AGO.  This program is composed of a “hard” or infrastructure and equipment component, and a “soft” or technical skills development component.  Specially trained staff, sufficiently remunerated, will be necessary to ensure this program yields the results promised.  Special projects of this program will include Litigation Support and Case Management (LSCM) systems that will improve case management.  LSCM will ultimately improve oversight procedures by reducing miscarriages of justice and lack of due process due to clerical ineptitude.  LSCM will also discover discrepancies due to unethical or corrupt behavior.

6. The Infrastructure and Equipment Development and Maintenance Programs will provide the resource strategy to support technical activities.  The total will be $28.22 million over five years.  See Appendix 4, below.
6a. Infrastructure Facilities Program including Construction and Rehabilitation/Renovation.  Based upon a sub-provincial presence program that will use vehicles and not require an office in every district, we estimate a need for 100 functional buildings.  This will cost a total of $17,000,000, based on $14,000,000 for 70% new buildings (70 total) and $3,000,000 for the 30% existing buildings (30 total) with significant renovation and rehabilitation.  The cost of new buildings is approximately $200,000 per building, including 20% or more for security provisions such as walls and metal detectors.
6b. Transportation Vehicles and Equipment Program.  The vehicle cost will be $6,420,000 over 3 years (with no procurement costs in the remaining two years)
6c. Maintenance for Facilities and Vehicles Program.  The maintenance for vehicles will be $4,800,000 over 5 years.  This cost will be sector-wide and can also maintain MOJ and SC vehicles.  The building facilities maintenance will be approximately $2,000,000 over 5 years, which will include capacity development, equipment and systems for monitoring and maintaining facilities.  UNDP is able to perform this latter subprogram as part of its management and administrative reform support program.

While the provision of space and equipment is a necessity and thus part of the development program, maintenance of these facilities and equipment is equally critical.  A dedicated maintenance program is necessary to ensure that the gains of physical infrastructure are not lost to decay and destruction due to lack of maintenance and management.  Accurate costing, forecasting, and planning with qualified staff will ensure that this is achieved.   In addition, this program will be responsible for distributing equipment and transportation resources equitably throughout the AGO.  Current transportation requirements include a need for approximately 400 new vehicles.  This would enable prosecutors to attend crime scenes, examine witnesses and victims in situ and at prosecution offices, ensure witness and victim attendance for investigations and court proceedings, facilitate file transfers to/from districts to/from provincial offices to/from the AGO HQ, and allow AGO HQ teams, committees, and provincial prosecutors to travel to the AGO HQ, provinces, and districts.  Other needs include equipment and furniture for the new headquarters and provincial and integrated justice facilities, communications equipment; and consumable supplies.

7. The Law Enforcement Justice Sector Cooperation Program. This program is composed of various discrete and inter-related projects.  The principal project is police-prosecutor collaboration, already authorized through a Minister of Interior-Attorney General Memorandum of Understanding signed with the facilitation of interested international donors.  The resulting guidelines and protocols will providing effective, efficient and timely collaboration in the investigation of crimes, and provide an exemplar for further cooperative efforts.  Foreseeable projects are as follows. (1) Collaborating with other agencies (NGOs and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs) in implementing the EVAW and NAPWA targets.  (2) An International Cooperation and Collaboration Project involving acquiring specialized skill sets to implement the expected new law on Extradition and International Legal Cooperation.  This project would also advise Afghan government agencies, including AGO divisions, on issues relating to assistance and cooperation in legal matters.  This will be essential to enable Afghanistan to successfully combat and prosecute transnational crimes.

8. The Communications and Public Awareness Program.  This program will ensure that the Afghanistan community perceives the prosecutor (“the Saranwal”) with trust and faith as an advocate of justice and protector of the Afghan People and will improve the credibility of the prosecution service through community awareness and will inform and discuss with the public on public safety and security issues.  It will educate the public on the methods used by and results achieved by the AGO, while it attempts to ensure that witnesses and victims are protected, supported, and assisted during the criminal justice process.

9. The Provincial and Sub-Provincial Development Program.  This program will address the structural and cultural issues that the AGO does not address due to the lack of the prosecutorial reach of the AGO in parts of Afghanistan.  This program will design and implement roll-out and pilot strategies for the initiatives (1-11) above and seek to allocate resources and developmental needs outside of the center, as it projects the rule of law throughout the country.

10. The NAPWA and EVAW Implementation Program.  This program is needed to implement the justice components of NAPWA and EVAW, including supporting and publicizing the Family Response Units (FRUs).  FRUs involve police and prosecutors working to detect, document, investigate, and prosecute family violence.  It is a coordinating program to integrate gender into the organizational structure and culture of the AGO.  The funding of the AGO HQ child care facility will be part of this program, as the existing program has been recently forced to close due to lack of funds.

11. The Afghanistan Prosecutors Association (APA) Program: This program seeks to develop and extend the scope and reach of the APA to all members of the prosecution service in Afghanistan.  It will also link the APA and the AGO to international prosecuting agencies and associations for training and exchange of ideas, and will provide assistance in obtaining international legal cooperation.  The APA will thus provide an independent source of future and alternative prosecutorial leadership, community outreach, and legal literacy for Afghanistan.
 
SECTION FIVE : PRIORITIZATION OF PROJECTS FOR BUDGET
List your Projects in 4 Priority Groups- also prioritize projects within each Group.  For instance, Group 1 Projects are of highest priority- list projects in this Group in order of priority also.  Prioritization must include “funded” projects as well.  In order words, prioritization must be determined on the basis of relevance and importance of a project in the development of or progress in a sector and not necessarily on funding availability.


The AGO respectfully declines at this stage of the strategy, in light of the information currently available, to attempt to prioritize its above eleven programs.  To do so would likely create a false impression that such prioritization was rationally arrived at through studied policy decisions.  

The eleven (11) programs listed in Section Four are meant to be accomplished in an integrated manner, and not in a sequential order.  Second, some of the programs are short term, some long term, and some continuous, so that comparing and prioritizing all programs against each other is not helpful.  Third, The AGO firmly believes that it is practically impossible to properly “prioritize” a program until the approximate amount of donor funding is known.  Most of the AGO programs can be “costed” at various levels, and thus the number of programs can vary with the same donor funding.  Therefore, for “X” dollars/Afghanis from the donors plus Afghan Government many if not all of the programs could be funded, albeit some at insufficient levels.  

The AGO would prefer to have the flexibility of making its own decisions as to how to use any donor funds, rather than listing in a mechanical fashion “priority” programs within four groups, and further to be forced to artificially prioritize the programs in each group.  Once an idea of the total donor funding is given, and costing done, the AGO will be an a much better position to then attempt to prioritize or state which programs cannot be funded at all.

Accordingly, the AGO offers for Section Five (and Section Six) the following log frames:













SECTION SIX : MONITORING AND EVALUATION

1.    Use of LOG Frame as attached- Objectives, Impact, Outcome and Outputs and Indicators
2.    Use of Monitoring Matrices Input and Output Data



Appendix 1:   Log Frame Ministry Sector Strategy LOG Framework Analysis (LFA)

1.    This results-based framework is intended to assist Ministries in clarifying their strategic goal and expected key impact and outcomes.
2.    The impact of the Ministry strategy at the program level should be listed.
3.    Key indicators reflecting achievement of the impact should be listed.
4.    Projects should be prioritized on the basis of the contributions each makes to the achievement of the overall Program impact.
5.    A brief listing of the risks with the program and projects is to be listed and a risk management strategy prepared as an attachment.


AGO Strategic Goal 1 -
Enhancing professionalism, integrity & credibility of the AGO

Objectives/
Programme    Project     Expected Results    Indicators    Risk
Professional development,












    Induction Training










Provincial Prosecutor Training


Continuing Legal Education



    By 2008, 100%  of entry level prosecutors completed








By 2009,  20% of prosecutors completed


Develop & improve prosecutor skill sets


    Stage Course institutionalized: Minimum competence levels for all prosecutors

100% of new applicants are graduates of law or sharia faculties

Regional Training Programs raising:

Minimum competency levels  for existing prosecutors

Critical/Core CLE skills identified
Sufficient # of  Afghan instructors to conduct CLE

    Course curriculum, space needs and instructor availability
Sustained political & resource support.
Lack of effective monitoring and evaluation
Lack of gender and ethnic diversity


International instructors/ mentors, political support, funding

    Speciali-zation













Training & Develop-ment for support services







    50% prosecutors at HQ by 2009, 10% provinces by 2010











Paralegal & Litigation support training for specialized departments



Leadership & management development


    Completed competitive selection process for specialization
Specialized instruction and curriculum.

Vocational specialized skills acquisition
International internships and placement

Competitive selection & training for paralegal staff

Tailored short programs and workshops to improve support service delivery, especially facilities management.


    Sustainability and resource constraints. Length of time to develop specializations. Political support. Service tenure of trained staff.


Resource constraints. Lack of international support.
Commitment of selected personnel to return to Afghanistan after foreign training.
Political support.
Integrity & Ethics Program    Integrity














    By 2007, the AGO Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct

By 2008, 100% of prosecutors at AGO HQ trained & 30% in 4 of the major provinces.  All trained in ethics by 2010.



Prosecutor’s Promise in place by 2009
    Completed draft, promulgation by the AG and distribution throughout the AGO.

Training on Ethics

Promulgation of guidelines and instructions based on Law on AGO and procedures

Ethics Panel & Inspector General (Professional Development) Division to advise on, review and consider ethics complaints.

Procedures in place and functioning.

Public understands aware of complaint procedures through awareness campaigns
    National Assembly enactment of Law on Organization of AGO including disciplinary procedures.

Train-the-trainers program funding and availability of qualified international mentors and Afghan trainers.
Communications and Public Awareness Program    By  2011,  improved credibility & public perception     Criminal justice Citizens Charter in place by 2009





Criminal justice system that works and is perceived to be working.    Charter developed explaining duties of prosecutors and expectations for citizens

Accessible public communications and complaint mechanisms in place.

Media & Public relations unit established

Public Perception Surveys

Reporting and timely publication of Saranwal journal.

Community outreach & APA supporting activities

Increase in the number of complaints, and in disciplinary proceedings resulting in punishment.

Increased number of referrals for corruption to criminal justice system for investigation.

Decrease in number of miscarriages of justice, corrupt and unethical activity by AGO.    
Strategic Goal  -
Human Resources (See also Professionalism)
Objectives/
Programme    Project     Expected Results    Indicators    Risk
Leadership Management and resource strategy implementa-tion    Afghan Prosecutors Association


Management and leadership development

    40% joining by 2008    Number of legal articles and proposals written, lectures/speaking engagements to schools or community and public places provided, conferences and training lectures done    Charter/By-Laws not approved.  Fragmentation of leadership.
Lack of funding for separate office premises.
Lack of support by AGO in terms of allowing duty time for APA managers.
    Ethics Panel and
Transparent Disciplinary Procedures    See above.        
    Transparent recruitment, retention, promotion and retirement procedures    See above.

Training on procedures and distribution of materials explaining it.        National Assembly enactment of Law on Organization of AGO including disciplinary procedures.

Train-the-trainers program funding and availability of qualified international mentors and Afghan trainers.














AGO Strategic Goal  -
Oversight procedures for miscarriage of justice, lack of due process
Objectives/
Programme    Project     Expected Results    Indicators    Risk
Management Information systems
    See Infra-structure Goal



    Improved data collection on efficiency and effectiveness of prosecution    Caseload performance measures.

Records keeping measured by life cycle of investigative and prosecuting events    
Law Reform & policy Analysis
    
    Improved Service delivery. Improved capacity to set criminal justice policy.    Prosecutors Promise.

Criminal justice Citizens Charter.

Investigation-prosecution management guidelines.

Data analysis and performance measures due process and substantive Human rights compliance issues (including case completion rates).

Complaints and ethics discipline mechanisms.

Institutionalize policy making at High Council
    Process paralysis.
Coordination and implementation.
Data gathering and interpretation.
Law Enforcement & justice Sector Cooperation        Police Prosecutor collaboration institutionalized.

International cooperation operational.

Inter-agency cooperation improved     MOI-AGO Commission operational.

Joint guidelines developed by Commission.

Operational international unit
Criminal Justice citizens charter    Inability to cooperate and produce joint guidelines due to political or institutional inertia.
NAPWA & EVAW implementa-tion Strategy    Gender equity & main-streaming    By 2009 30% of all technical and senior positions to be filled at  AGO by females    Active and affirmative recruitment & promotion of women.  Policies and procedures in place to implement.
     Family ties. Reluctance of females to join AGO.
Cultural reluctance to accept job offers.
    Access to Justice for women, children & others    Improve women’s access to and treatment by criminal justice System    Integrating Family Response Units (FRUs) into investigation and prosecution framework.

Disaggregate data on police referrals, charging decisions by sex.

Review cases of moral crimes in all large provinces where women detained and charging decisions.    
    Prosecutor presence & activity  in 95% of country    By 2010 prosecutorial presence covers 95% of country (security situation permitting)        
    Ethics and integrity    Ethics panel operational, hearing cases and publishing opinions and rulings by 2008    Complaints mechanism in place and operational,
(see ethics above)    






AGO Strategic Goal-
Functioning institutions at Headquarters (HQ) and provincial level:

Objectives/
Programme    Project     Expected Results    Indicators    Risk
Organizational Restructuring Program,  & Provincial & Sub Provincial Prosecution Program
    Phase 1











Phase 2






    Operational specialized and integrated departments and divisions    New Depts. of:  Anti-Corruption,
Professional (IG)       
Development,
Special Prosecutions (international unit, gross human rights, special victims), and Cassation (Solicitor General).

AG’s Front Office restructuring and establishing post of Principal Deputy.

MIS,  redesigned existing units,  National Security Unit to incorporate specialist counter terrorism unit    Capacity to implement. Political will.
Developing & synchronizing skill development

    Integrated Prosecution Strategy
    Streamlined – efficient and effective prosecution methodology and set of practices        




AGO Strategic Goal  -
Infrastructure rehabilitation
Objectives/
Programme    Project     Expected Results    Indicators    Risk
Infra-structure & equipment
development & maintenance
    Buildings and Premises


    New AGO HQ completed and equipped by end 2008

10 newly completed or renovated AGO provincial HQs  by 2011


Adequate allocation & occupation of space in IJF and vacated AGO premises    Construction project plan completion rate
is timely.

Disbursements and certificates.

Improved staff to room ratio.

Improved work environment

Facilities provided for women and children, & accessible to disabled     Poor project execution.

Under funding.

Lack of political support.

Under-developed facilities management capacity.

Sub-provincial presence policy coordination required.
    Equipment
    Adequate equipment enhances service delivery and mandate achievement    Provision and maintenance of appropriate office furniture & fittings:
Information & communications technology;
consumables
    Poor project execution.

Under-developed proficiency of procurement rules.
    Vehicles    Sufficient number of modes of transportation  improving service delivery & mandate achievement    Comprehensive assessment of transportation needs.

Transportation strategy closely related to sub-national infrastructure presence.

Several cars and motorcycles for each AGO HQ division, each provincial office and in key districts.    Poor coordination.

Poor maintenance.

Abuse of government property
Management Information systems     Computer-izing data and archival informa-tion for Human Resources at HQ    Improve Human Resources, finance and payroll efficiency and effectiveness to process employee related information    Build staff IS capacity.
Provide necessary IS hardware, improve mechanisms, and develop software and procedural applications
    Project development, and  management
Inertia and resistance
    Case manage-ment systems & file identify-cation    Improve technical control and processing of investigations and prosecutions    capacity for prosecutor information management
paralegal and clerical staff skills
design and introduce filing and case systems    
    Archives,  Resource Center & website    Completed and operational law library at HQ by 2008, and in ten provinces by 2010

Website completed and operational by end of 2007    File Archives.

Libraries.

Dissemination of basic criminal laws (paper) to all prosecutors.

Web committee established and
Web manager recruited.

Website live.
    Sustained donor support.

On time delivery of donor commitment.

Political will.

Maintenance and sustainability
               




















Appendix 2.  Costing Summary for Programs


Total current and incomplete estimated costs are US$ 201,250,000.00

Program    Component     Total Estimated Cost (US $ Million))
* 5 years =  75.25
        2008    2009    2010    2011    2012
Professional
Development Program    Salaries    14.96
    14.34    13.99    13.62    13.20
    •    Stage Course     .62    .48    .36    .36    .30
    •    CLE    .60    .60    .60    .30    .30
    •    Int’l Scholarships    .35    .35    .35    .35    .35
    •    Law School Internship    .25    .10    .10    .10    .10


Program    Component     Total Estimated Cost (US $ Million))
* 5 years =  20.00
        2008    2009    2010    2011    2012
Infrastructure, Transportation and Equipment    Building & Rehab’    3.4
    3.4    3.4    3.4    3.4
    •    Transportation    3.2        3.22        
    •    Equipment    TBD    TBD    TBD    TBD    TBD

Program    Component     Total Estimated Cost (US $ Million))
* 5 years = 70.65
        2008    2009    2010    2011    2012
Organizational Restructuring ( specialized dept set up costs including,  tech’ Advisors,     Total
    15.75
    14.80    13.65    13.50    12.95


Program    Component     Total Estimated Cost (US $ Million))
* 5 years =  11.20
        2008    2009    2010    2011    2012
Management & Administration    Fleet Vehicle Maintenance    2.4
        2.4        
    •    Facilities Management capacity development    .3    .48    0.3    0.3    .30
    •    Information Management    .962    .850    .850    ,150    .150
    •    Procurement    .35    .35    .35    .35    .35


Program    Component     Total Estimated Cost (US $ Million))
* 5 years =  XXXX
        2008    2009    2010    2011    2012
Law Reform    Policy analysis,     TBD
    TBD    TBD    TBD    TBC
    •    AGO High Council    TBD    TBD    TBD    TBD    TBD
    •    Appellate functions     TBD    TBD    TBD    TBD    TBD


Program    Component     Total Estimated Cost (US $ Million))
* 5 years =  5.60
        2008    2009    2010    2011    2012
Law Enforcement Justice Sector Cooperation Programme    CJTF - Narcotics    CN-budget                
    •    Anti-Corruption    See above in    Org change            
    •    EVAW    .60    .60    .60    .30    .30
    •    Police Prosecutor    0.8    .8    0.6    0,6    0,4
    •    Transitional Justice    Transitional     Justice             


Program    Component     Total Estimated Cost (US $ Million))
* 5 years =  3.55
        2008    2009    2010    2011    2012
Communications     Develop complaints systems    .75
    .75    .50        
    •    Develop Whistle Blower mechanisms    .75    0.3    .3    .1    .1

Program    Component     Total Estimated Cost (US $ Million))
* 5 years =  15.00
        2008    2009    2010    2011    2012
Provincial Prosecutor Programme    Capacity building + TAs’    1.5
    3.0    3.5    3.5    3.5









Appendix 3.  Detailed Costing for Specific Programs:  Salary

Salary costing estimates designed to reflect on ANDS Macro-economic projections for Afghanistan including CPI and growth in government expenditures. Salary scales and ranking designed to reflect 8 grade pay and grading contemplated by Civil Service Commission.  

Assumptions:  1. staff growth rate 3% p.a.; 2. GOA increased expenditure allows for 5% p.a. cumulative increased salary contribution.

Detailed Salary Costing (as of 1386 staffing)                            
Scale and rank    Pay Band (monthly)    2007-2008    2008-2009    2009-2010    2010-2011    2011-2012    2012-2013
top 2% AG,DAG, Super scale specialisations    $1300-$2000    59.10    60.87    62.70    64.58    66.52    68.51
Next 3% HQ Div Directors (Raees) & Provin. Prosecutors of major provinces)    $800-$1400    88.65    91.31    94.05    96.87    99.78    102.77
Next 10% HQ Div. Directors + Provincial heads + Mid- level specialist     $600-$900    295.50    304.37    313.50    322.90    332.59    342.57
next 10% Senior prosecutors & Senior Admin    $500-$800    295.50    304.37    313.50    322.90    332.59    342.57
Next 15% Mid-level prosecutors - entry level specialization    $375-$675    443.25    456.55    470.24    484.35    498.88    513.85
Next 20% Mid-level prosecutors & specialist technical admin    $150-$500    591.00    608.73    626.99    645.80    665.18    685.13
Next 25% Entry, junior, lay prosecutor     $150-$300    738.75    760.91    783.74    807.25    831.47    856.41
Next 15% clerical and junior level administrators     $50-$175    443.25    456.55    470.24    484.35    498.88    513.85
Based on 3% per annum staff increases compounded            0    0    0        
TOTAL STAFF         2955    3043.65    3134.9595    3229.008285    3325.878534    3425.65489
Scale and rank    Pay Band (monthly)                        
top 2% AG,DAG, Super scale specialisations    $1300-$2000    $97,515    $102,267    $105,335    $108,495    $111,750    $115,102
Next 3% HQ Div Directors & major provinces)    $800-$1400    $97,515    $105,462    $103,454    $106,557    $109,754    $113,047
Next 10% HQ div dirs + Provincial heads + Mid- level specialist     $600-$900    $221,625    $239,687    $235,122    $242,176    $249,441    $256,924
next 10% Senior prosecutors & Senior Admin    $500-$800    $192,075    $175,771    $172,423    $177,595    $182,923    $188,411
Next 15% mid-level prosecutors - entry level specialization    $375-$675    $232,706    $191,750    $197,502    $203,428    $209,530    $215,816
Next 20% Mid & specialist technical admin    $150-$500    $192,075    $191,750    $197,502    $203,428    $209,530    $215,816
Next 25% Entry, junior, lay prosecutor     $150-$300    $166,219    $179,766    $185,159    $190,713    $196,435    $202,328
Next 15% clerical and junior level administrators     $50-$175    $49,866    $59,922    $61,720    $63,571    $65,478    $67,443
Based on 5% increases per anumm compounded                            
                           
Monthly Total         $1,249,596    $1,246,375    $1,258,216    $1,295,962    $1,334,841    $1,374,887
Annual Total  (GOA contribution starts 2009-10)        $14,995,148    $14,956,496    $14,343,662    $13,996,395    $13,615,382    $13,198,911
GOA contribution at annual increases of 5% p.a.                            
Aggregate Total (2008-2013) (excludes 2007-08)